

# THEOLOGY

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all editorial matters should be addressed.

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## EDITORIAL

WE welcome the encouragement given by the Archbishop of Canterbury to Church-people to take their share in responding to the Pope's appeal for the observance of this year as the nineteenth centenary of our Lord's crucifixion. Such an expression of Christian solidarity is particularly opportune at the present time, when the powers of anti-Christ are being manifested in all their unashamed brutality in Russia. The fact is plain that Bolshevism represents today something no less diabolical than did the Spanish Inquisition in the sixteenth century. Here, indeed, in Moscow is the modern Sodom, Babylon, the great whore, whose iniquity is being propagated throughout the world; and only the prayers and courage of a united Christendom will prevail to overthrow it.

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We are taking the unusual course this month of devoting nearly half the number to a single article. Professor Morris's discussion of the evidence for our Lord's institution of the Eucharist is, however, so close-knit and so compact that it would not easily divide; and we believe that our readers will desire to have the whole of it in their hands at one time. The issue with which it deals was effectively treated by Professor N. P. Williams in *Essays Catholic and Critical*: but the Modernist case has been presented again since that essay was first published, and it is with these fresh arguments—if, indeed, they can be called fresh—that Professor Morris deals.

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Our readers will join with us in hearty congratulations to Dr. Kirk on his appointment to the chair of Moral Theology in the University of Oxford. No one has done more in recent years to arouse the Church to the importance of the subject, and to illuminate it by his own writings; and we wish him God-speed in his new sphere of work.



## JESUS AND THE EUCHARIST

MEN used to dispute mightily about the meaning of Holy Communion, never dreaming that the origin of the rite itself was a problem, and Roman Catholics like Père de la Taille can still write as if there is no question about what took place in the Upper Room. It is becoming more widely known, however, that the origin of the Sacrament is itself a complicated issue. "In our day," says Brilioth (*Eucharistic Faith and Practice*), "to take for granted even that the Eucharist rests upon the direct command of Jesus is, in fact, to evade one of the hardest problems with which modern study has to deal" (p. 2). Bishop Gore, it is true, although admitting a doubt about the Dominical institution of the rite of Confirmation, felt able to claim that "about the Eucharist there can be no question" (*New Commentary*, Part III., p. 295), but his own writings show that this is not so. Canon Quick, more cautiously, is only ready to plead for "the possibility of Christ's institution having been implicit in some degree" (*The Christian Sacraments*, p. 122).

We are not here concerned with the more drastic reconstructions of those who feel free to reject any of the New Testament evidence that does not fit into their preconceived schemes. We allow that evidence is rightly suspect if it involves internal inconsistencies or lacks full textual attestation, but maintain that it is unscientific to reject it merely because we do not like it.

We begin, then, by asking, At what period did Christians first celebrate the Eucharist? The question would have seemed ridiculous at one time, when all men took it for granted that the Acts gives a reliable historical account of the early days, and that the references to "the breaking of the bread" in chapter ii., verses 42 and 46, and chapter xx., verse 7, were obviously references to the Eucharist. Both these assumptions, however, are now widely questioned. Our own view is that the Acts is, in a general way, a good historical record, and as it is difficult to see any reason for the *invention* of the references to the breaking of the bread, we assume that this practice was prevalent in the early days. Yet it is still possible to doubt whether the Eucharist is meant. The phrase "breaking bread at home" (Acts ii. 46) is perhaps a rather odd way of referring to such a rite as is briefly described in 1 Cor. xi., and doubt is not dispelled by St. Luke's account of how Jesus was known to two of His disciples in "the breaking of the bread" (St. Luke xxiv. 30-35) on an occasion when, in spite of verse 30, it is difficult to suppose that the Eucharist is meant.



especially when we compare this passage with Acts xxvii. 35. Nor is it really unquestionable that the longer description of the breaking of the bread in Acts xx. 7-11 refers to the communion of the Body and Blood of Christ as described in 1 Cor. xi. True, later Christians see nothing strange in calling what they believe to be a tremendous mystery by the simple title, The Breaking of the Bread, but they do so because of the influence of the Lukan passages referred to above, and we may fairly question whether this title would ever have been thought of if it were not for these passages.

Here we may remark that the doubt about these Lukan passages may legitimately be extended to the well-known passages in the Didache. This is often admitted as regards chapters ix. and x., but not as regards chapter xiv. These passages use, indeed, the word Eucharist, and refer to the cup as well as to the bread, while the beautiful thought of the corn scattered upon the mountains and gathered together into one loaf found its way into some liturgies. There is also the stipulation that those taking part must have been baptized, and, apparently most difficult of all, the application of the word "sacrifice" to the rite in question. Yet it is possible that what is referred to is not the communion of the Body and Blood of Christ at all, but a fellowship-meal, strongly religious in character but in no way mysterious. We note that nowhere is there any mention of the communion of the Body and Blood or even of union with Jesus through what was being done. The omission is particularly noticeable in the thanksgivings in chapter ix. There is, of course, the sentence in chapter x., "Thou didst give food and drink unto men for enjoyment, that they might render thanks unto thee; but didst bestow upon us spiritual food and drink and eternal life through thy Son"; but we are not bound to assume that the "spiritual food and drink" are the bread and cup of the rite, for the latter might equally be merely "the food and drink given unto men for enjoyment." The transition from the thought of physical food to that of spiritual food is natural enough, especially if the physical food had just been used to promote religious fellowship. Further, even if the cup and bread of the rite referred to in chapter ix. are meant by the "spiritual food and drink" of chapter x., it by no means follows that the communion of the Body and Blood is meant, for 1 Cor. x. 3-4 is sufficient warning against supposing that only this latter could be referred to as "spiritual food and drink" (cf. also Ps. lxxviii. 25; St. John iv. 10-14, vii. 37-38). The baptismal qualification for a religious fellowship-meal would be understandable enough. But what of the word "sacrifice"? Would this be applied to a mere fellow-



ship-meal? It all depends on what was meant by sacrifice. If what was meant was the "sacrifice of praise" or "the well-doing and fellowship" of Hebrews xiii. 15-16, the application is likely enough. That in the Didache the word "sacrifice" refers to a self-offering seems to be implied by the emphasis upon confession of sin and the need of mutual charity. That this self-offering is associated with the other idea of the Eucharistic sacrifice in later liturgies does not prove that it was not, in the circle for which the Didache was written, associated with a non-mysterious fellowship-meal. The use of the word Eucharist need occasion no difficulty, for it would be rash to assume that Christians could not apply so general a term to anything except the communion of the Body and the Blood. We conclude, then, that it is possible that in all three passages the Didache refers to an ordinary fellowship-meal, not to the communion of the Body and the Blood.\* This, incidentally, would relieve us of a well-known difficulty—viz., the apparent sanction of the celebration of Holy Communion by a possibly unordained prophet.

Against what we have just said may fairly be set the fact that St. Ignatius, perhaps at an earlier date than the Didache, does clearly apply the term Eucharist, and apparently the phrase "breaking one loaf," to the communion of the Body and the Blood. We should, however, remember that St. Ignatius is not certainly earlier than the Didache, and that, even if he is, we have no reason to assume that the Didache must have used language in the same way as St. Ignatius did. There are good reasons for supposing that the Didache represents the ideas prevalent in a backwater Christian community, and its language may therefore have its own *nuance*. We are not assuming that the rite referred to in the Didache was not the Holy Communion. What we say is that it is not certain that it was this. It may have been a fellowship-meal of a non-mysterious character. In the same way we are prepared to admit the possibility, though not the certainty, that the passages in Acts mentioned above may be references, not to the communion of the Body and the Blood, but to a fellowship-meal for which the term "The Breaking of the Bread" is appropriate. Now if they are the latter, we are left with the rather startling fact that St. Paul is our first and only New Testament witness to the celebration of the Sacrament of the Lord's Body and Blood. The shock is lessened by the reflection that it is only as it were by accident that we have even the references in 1 Corinthians, for the difference made by this one Epistle shows us how easily we might have been completely misled about New Testament worship.

\* See F. Gavin in *Liturgy and Worship* (S.P.C.K., 1932), p. 87.



If there had not been trouble at Corinth our earliest indisputable reference to the celebration of the Sacrament of the Lord's Body and Blood would have been the Ignatian Epistles! The Gospel accounts of the Last Supper would have formed no exception to this, for St. Luke's account would have lacked the passage which, as seems certain, has been interpolated from 1 Cor. xi., and without this there would be nothing to suggest that the rite in the Upper Room had been in any sense repeated. There would, of course, be St. John vi., but this by itself does not really suggest anything more than what took place in the Upper Room. To read verse 53 as if it read, "Except ye eat the flesh of the Son of Man and drink his blood after he is dead and raised and glorified," is to import into it a notion borrowed from another source, and, without 1 Corinthians, the first available source would be the Ignatian Epistles. Some who dislike the traditional theory of the origin of the Sacrament seize on this isolation of the Pauline references to urge that "the Christian Sacrament, as we know it, represents the early Christian custom of the common meal mixed with an infusion of sacrificial mysticism, probably due to St. Paul" (P. Gardner, *Exploratio Evangelica*, p. 461).

Now if it was St. Paul who converted a non-mysterious fellowship-meal into a mystic sacrament we should either have to say at once that he was acting *ultra vires*, or else, driven to admit that 1 Cor. xi. 23 refers to a vision, trust ourselves absolutely to the precarious foundation of a vision claimed to have been seen by him. Few orthodox Christians, we fancy, would feel easy in their minds if they were forced to allow that the Sacrament of the Lord's Body and Blood rests only on a vision of St. Paul's.

The theory that St. Paul is the creator of the Sacrament as we know it, however, is too difficult to be accepted. The experience recorded in 1 Cor. xi. 23 is not dated, but whether we put it early or late we encounter difficulties. If we put it early in St. Paul's Christian career we reach a period when his authority was much less than it afterwards became, and the less probable is it, therefore, that he could have succeeded merely by his claim to have seen a vision in persuading the Church to accept anything so staggering as the change from an ordinary fellowship-meal (common in the Græco-Roman world at that time) to a mysterious Sacrament of awful significance, without leaving so much as a ripple on the surface of the New Testament, especially if Bishop Gore is right in his assertion that "the idea of a sacrament in the strict sense . . . was alien to the Jewish tradition" (*op. cit.*, p. 296). An attempt might be made to get round this difficulty by the suggestion, never yet made as far



as we know, that it was only at Corinth that St. Paul sought to propagate his new sacramentalism. This suggestion, however, would raise other difficulties. We should either have to abandon the idea that the new departure suggested itself to St. Paul early in his Christian career, or else suppose that after this idea came to him he went on founding other churches without making use of it, which seems too violent an alternative. If, further, it was only at Corinth that he converted the fellowship-meal into a mysterious sacrament, then we should have the rather odd situation that his innovation led immediately to the trouble alluded to in 1 Cor. xi., and yet, when dealing with the trouble, St. Paul gives not the slightest hint that the sacramental ideas he is defending were novelties. Moreover, verse 34 hints at the suppression of the fellowship-meal, or at least at its separation from the Sacrament. Thus in a few years, on this theory, St. Paul grafted his innovation upon an already venerable rite, and then succeeded in separating the parasite from its host and in making it stand in its own right, all without exciting the opposition of those who in that Church were already opposed to him on other grounds. There is also the difficulty, often urged, of supposing that a vision would take the form of the historical narrative in 1 Cor. xi. 23 *ff.* On the other hand, putting the genesis of the sacramental idea *late* in St. Paul's Christian career, we should meet the insurmountable difficulty that by this time, though his authority was greater, it was challenged by persistent opponents who, bitterly hostile to him on the question of Gentile liberty from the Jewish Law, would, we may be sure, have eagerly seized on this innovation, whether it were alien to the Jewish tradition or not, to discredit St. Paul, more especially as the theory is that the idea came to St. Paul, not really "from the Lord," but by suggestion from the Mystery Religions. At once he would have been open to the charge that he was trying to corrupt Christianity by introducing features from Pagan sources—an accusation that he could not have met very easily (for who would have been satisfied with his plea that he had got his new ideas in a vision?), and which, unmet, would have proved fatal to his influence. This consideration, we believe, rules out the theory of the Pauline creation of the sacramental idea. We must add also that the notion that the sacramental idea came to St. Paul late in his Christian career and that the source was the Pagan Mysteries fails to surmount the difficulty that at this very period he was keenly alive to the danger of the corruption of Christianity from this very source (see 1 Cor. x. 19-22). To suggest that he was at one and the same time both actively combating and also zealously propagating influences from the Pagan Mysteries



is to do much less than justice to the acuteness and integrity of St. Paul's mind. We do not believe that he could have been guilty of such mental dissociation.

St. Paul, then, must be acquitted of the charge of creating the Sacrament of the Lord's Body and Blood. But if so, then the notion that 1 Cor. xi. 23 refers to a vision disappears. "I received of the Lord" must mean, "from the Lord through the Church." Moreover, the source of St. Paul's information must have been authoritative. He would not have accepted it and so described it merely on the word of some obscure Christian uncorroborated by the Church at large. We must remember that he was acquainted with Christians in widely separated regions, and would therefore not have adopted such a tremendous thing as he evidently felt the Sacrament to be unless it was part of the common tradition. It is not probable that he who appealed to the general custom of the churches about the question whether ladies should wear hats at worship (1 Cor. xi. 16) was on this more important question of the Sacrament indifferent to the common tradition.

How, then, did this sacramentalism become part of the common tradition of the Church? If St. Paul is not the creator, and we are determined not to accept the Dominical institution, some other culprit must be found. He has been discovered, tentatively at any rate, by Archdeacon Hunkin at Syrian Antioch, which place, since Streeter's *The Primitive Church*, seems likely to become the happy hunting ground of those in search of scapegoats upon which to father unorthodox theories. Dr. Hunkin's reconstruction, given in his essay on "The Origin of Eucharistic Doctrine" in *The Evangelical Doctrine of Holy Communion* (edited by A. J. Macdonald, 1930), is as follows. The passages in the Acts mentioned above refer only to a fellowship-meal, which was the only Lord's Supper in the earliest days. Whether there was any felt connexion between this and the Last Supper or not St. Luke leaves doubtful. Wine was not necessarily always provided. Hunkin thinks that the original text of St. Luke xxii. 14 ff. omitted the whole of verses 19-20 (i.e., St. Luke had no account either of the bread or of the covenant-cup), remarking that this makes it "easier to understand why in the allusions to the breaking of the bread throughout the Lukan writings (both in the Gospel and the Acts) there is no hint of any connexion between this fellowship-meal and the Last Supper" (p. 10). But he treats the text of Codex Bezae and its allies (i.e., verses 15-19a and verses 21 ff. —the text of R.V. m.) as preserving a distinct tradition—viz., of the cup before the bread, as in the Didache (cf. 1 Cor. x. 16). "This tradition," he remarks, "knows nothing of the



wine as representing Christ's Blood, but only of the bread as representing Christ's Body. And this goes far to remove a great difficulty, the difficulty to which Klausner refers when he writes, 'The drinking of blood, even if it was meant symbolically, could only have aroused horror in the minds of such simple Galilean Jews.'" Hunkin therefore urges that this tradition must be taken seriously. This, however, still leaves us with the apparently mysterious words, "This is My Body," but Hunkin is ready with an explanation. Jesus had probably shortly before seen the Passover lambs. "If so, with the image of the Passover lambs destined to be slain next day before His eyes, and with the words of Isaiah liii. 7 at the back of His mind, was He not, as we should say, in just such a psychological condition as might naturally give rise to the symbolic action and words recorded of Him in the Gospels? As the bodies of the lambs would next day be left lifeless in the Temple, so His Body too would be left lifeless; and He broke the loaf and said, 'This represents what is about to happen to Me: this is My Body'" (pp. 16-17). The words, then, are nothing more than a prophecy of the Cross, and should never have given rise to any sacramental notion of eating the Lord's Body. Thus, according to Hunkin, "the reconstruction of the Last Supper which is least assailable on the evidence at present available is that based first on St. Luke xxii. 14-18 . . . and secondly on 1 Cor. xi. 24a and St. Mark xiv. 22" (pp. 17-18); that is, we have a cup before the bread about which nothing like "This is My Blood" is said, and the bread treated so as to be merely prophetic of the Cross. Clearly there is nothing here on which a sacrament can properly be based. This brings us to what Hunkin calls "the next stage." We have the fellowship-meals mentioned in the Acts, originating independently of the Last Supper. "How far or how often these meals included a reference to the Last Supper we do not know. Eucharists containing no such reference long survived, at all events in certain districts, as the evidence of the Didache seems to show" (p. 18). We must pause to remark that this is merely a bold use of the *argumentum e silentio*. We may not know how often these meals included a reference to the Last Supper, but there is not a tittle of evidence to prove that any one of them (including the one mentioned in the Didache) did *not* do so. Hunkin proceeds as follows: "We are left to conjecture, and we may conjecture somewhat as follows. On certain occasions . . . and when wine was provided as well as bread, something may have been said to connect the drinking of the wine with a joyful anticipation of the coming of God's Kingdom when the Lord, who, it might have been recalled, had refused to drink at the



Last Supper, would again drink with His disciples; and reference may also have been made to the Lord's symbolic action and the words, 'This is My Body,' uttered at the 'breaking of the bread.' Soon the Gospel reached Antioch, and at Antioch before long it was preached to Gentiles as well as to Jews. In the meantime there would be a natural tendency to emphasize, at least on certain occasions, the religious character of the Christian fellowship-meal. Some special significance would be sought in the wine as well as in the bread. The current phrase 'flesh and blood' might readily be found suggestive. It was an easy step to take the wine as representing the Lord's blood; not indeed a step that would have been natural to a Jew, but a step not difficult to imagine in a cosmopolitan city like Antioch" (pp. 18-19). Thus bit by bit the fellowship-meal came to be regarded as a memorial of the Last Supper, though originally quite independent of it, and a significance was found for the wine which was sometimes used.

Another step remains, however, before the New Testament evidence is fully accounted for. St. Paul in 1 Cor. xi. says that Jesus ordered that the rite of the Last Supper should be repeated, and this was felt by someone to be so important that he copied it into the text of St. Luke xxii. Yet of course Jesus can really have given no such order. What, then, is the origin of it? Hunkin says: "We must not forget the prophets, the Christian prophets (Acts xi. 27, xiii. 1). . . . The prophets felt themselves to be imbued with divine inspiration and so authorized to speak. And as they sometimes spoke of the future, so, no doubt, they also sometimes spoke of the past. All the Christians felt that in continuing to celebrate the Lord's Supper they were acting under the guidance of the Spirit of Christ. Was it then a prophet who first made explicit what everyone felt to be implicit in the Christian tradition; and, in what he felt to be a moment of inspiration, first uttered the words, "This do in remembrance of Me'?" (pp. 19-20). In passing we note that here Hunkin seems to have forgotten that he has just insisted that it is very doubtful whether at the fellowship-meals of the early Christians there was any reference to the Last Supper. We are now told that all Christians believed that they were continuing to celebrate the Supper under the inspiration of the Spirit of Christ.

Just one point more. "Lastly," says Dr. Hunkin, "the wine having been thought of as representing Christ's blood, it would not be long before some application would be made of the idea contained in the familiar phrase 'the blood of the covenant' (Exod. xxiv. 8)" (p. 20). So, by a series of developments, each innocent enough in itself, yet resulting in the



transformation of the fellowship-meal into the Sacrament of the Body and the Blood supposed to rest on Christ's ordinance, there came to be current in the Church at Antioch "just before the middle of the first century A.D." the sacramental ideas and practices which St. Paul inherited and upon which he worked in 1 Cor. xi. Clearly, if this is the basis of St. Paul's teaching in 1 Cor. xi., we are bound to reject that teaching as a corruption of the primitive Christian tradition.

Archdeacon Hunkin's reconstruction seems to us to be vulnerable at every point. To begin with, everything rests on the certainty of the assumption that "the breaking of the bread" in the Acts was merely a fellowship-meal, whereas the admission that this might be so is not fatal to the orthodox theory of the origin of the Sacrament. We have already admitted the possibility that this assumption is right, but it is fair to say what can be said to the contrary. Less than a year after St. Paul had written 1 Cor. xi. he was present at the breaking of the bread at Troas (Acts xx. 7-12), apparently as president of the rite (verse xi.), and, as Hunkin admits, St. Luke was also present. Is it likely that this rite lacked the mysterious sacramental element of the rite in 1 Cor. xi.? St. Paul had spent nearly a week at Troas, and St. Luke evidently intends his readers to regard this incident as particularly solemn. It is the only thing he tells us about that week. One cannot be sure, but it does seem improbable that an occasion like this, with St. Paul present and almost certainly presiding, would be less significantly celebrated than an ordinary meeting of the Church at Corinth. But St. Luke, who was present, calls it simply "the breaking of the bread." Perhaps after all St. Luke did use the simple phrase to describe the Christian Mystery.

The next point is the assumption that the original fellowship-meals lacked any reference back to the Last Supper. We have already commented on this, but more needs to be said to expose the rashness of the assumption. We think it almost certain that Jesus and the Twelve regularly held the Kiddush-meal during His ministry, but whether they did so or not, it can hardly be doubted that there was a Last Supper. We think it incredible that the Eleven ever took part in a fellowship-meal after the Resurrection without recalling that Last Supper. Their recalling this would set the fashion for all Christian fellowship-meals. Hunkin has not attempted to *prove* that there was no reference back to the Upper Room, but doubts it because of the absence of any express statement in the three passages of the Acts that there was this reference. Now the first two passages only barely mention "the breaking of the bread"



and "breaking bread" respectively, while the third, which seems about to give us a description of the rite, is drawn aside to a narrative of the accident to Eutyches. We have really no right to expect in either of these passages the information which Dr. Hunkin thinks should be there, and it is unreasonable to regard their silence on this point as casting doubt on the length of the tradition behind 1 Cor. xi. 23 ff. We claim, then, that it is highly probable that from the first there was a reference at these celebrations to the Last Supper.

We turn now to the "great difficulty" that the drinking of blood, even symbolically, would have horrified a simple Galilean Jew. Is this so certain? It is not easy to see why a simple Galilean should have been more touchy in this respect than other Jews. It was the Law that forbade the drinking of blood, and Galileans are commonly supposed to have been less assiduous in the observance of the Law than were Jews in other parts. If, however, Jews would have been horrified at the idea, why were the words expressing it, in an even more "offensive" form than St. Paul's version of them, put into the "Jewish" Gospel of St. Matthew? Again, why was not St. Paul himself—a Hebrew of the Hebrews—shocked at the idea? Further, if St. Peter is behind St. Mark's Gospel, here is proof that the disciples did not find the idea shocking. With Jesus sitting before them they would not, of course, suppose that He referred to His physical flesh and blood.

Next we take the general objection to all high sacramentalism formulated by Hunkin thus: "No material thing was ever to a Jew in itself a vehicle of spiritual grace" (p. 14). The assertion, minus the words "to a Jew," is familiar in the sermons of Bishop Barnes, and he seems to think that it is fatal to the Catholic Doctrine of the Sacraments. This is a mistake, for a Catholic can subscribe whole-heartedly to the assertion. No material thing in itself *can* be a vehicle of spiritual grace, but it does not follow that God cannot make it such. If He cannot, then He has made a material world which He cannot use for spiritual purposes, which seems an absurd doctrine. May we ask whether a material thing *can* exist "in itself," that is, without being all the time an instrument in the hands of God? As for Jewish sacramentalism, is not the idea contained in the story of the coal from off the altar in Isaiah vi. 7? (see Skinner, *Isaiah*, *ad loc.*).

With Dr. Hunkin's suggestion that perhaps the sight of the Paschal lambs shortly to be slain led our Lord to think of Himself as about to become a lamb for the slaughter we need not quarrel. But if this led Him to break bread and say, "This is My Body," why should it not also have led Him to pour out



wine and say, "This is My Blood"? The lambs had to lose their blood as well as have their bodies broken. We have already dealt with the suggestion that the idea would have horrified a Jew. The other basis for the doubt whether Jesus said "This is My Blood" over the cup is that in St. Luke xxii. 15 ff. Codex Bezae and its allies, represented in R.V. m., mention a cup, but *before the bread* and with quite different words. But ought this Western text to be taken so seriously? Westcott and Hort note the *penchant* of the Western text for the "dangerous work of harmonistic corruption." Assuming for the moment that the original text of St. Luke xxii. omitted the whole of verses 19-20, we can understand how the copyist would try to bring it into line with other accounts. He added practically verbatim St. Paul's account of the actions and words with the bread, taking also *ἔδωκεν αὐτοῖς* from St. Mark. He did not, however, go on to copy St. Paul's account of the cup, seeing that St. Luke already had an account of a cup. On this view, the scribe who produced the parent of the Western text of St. Luke xxii. did not really have a different tradition from St. Paul's, but tried to assimilate St. Paul's tradition to the Lukan account. We need not suppose that he *preferred* the Lukan story of the cup to that of St. Paul, for he had already copied the Matthæan and Markan accounts of the cup, which are very similar to St. Paul's. To say, as Hunkin does, that this so-called Western tradition "knows nothing of the wine as representing Christ's Blood, but only of the bread as representing Christ's Body" (p. 10), is to forget that Codex Bezae contains the Matthæan and Markan accounts. We ought, we suggest, to speak (as regards St. Luke xxii. 15 ff.), not as Hunkin does of "the text reproduced by the scribe of D" (p. 11), but of the text *produced* by the scribe of D, for there is no evidence that it existed before he produced it. The Western text did not preserve a divergent tradition but produced one, and this need not worry us. We are not bound to suppose that the cup mentioned by St. Luke in xxii. 17-18 is the Covenant-cup. The Western text so understood it because its producer had already found in St. Matthew's and St. Mark's Gospels in connexion with the Covenant-cup the words which St. Luke associates with his cup before the bread. Is it not likely enough that there *were* two cups, that St. Luke has preserved only the words said in connexion with the earlier cup, and that St. Mark, perhaps for brevity's sake, or perhaps not understanding St. Peter's reminiscences, and followed by St. Matthew's Gospel, omitted the mention of the first cup but transferred from it to the second cup the words preserved in their original place by St. Luke? The problem which this



suggestion leaves unsolved is to account for the failure of the producer of the Western text to introduce into St. Luke xxii. 17-19 the words which the other Synoptists associate with the Covenant-cup and the command to repeat the rite found in 1 Cor. xi. He would have been more consistent if he had carried his harmonistic proclivities this further stage. We may not be able to guess why he did not do so, but, on the other hand, the fact that he had already copied the words about the Covenant-cup in the other two Gospels shows that he did not omit them from his copy of St. Luke's Gospel through dislike of them or through preoccupation with a divergent tradition. The failure of the Western text to carry the interpolation in St. Luke xxii. 19 beyond "This is My Body" is paralleled by the failure of any of the manuscripts to carry the interpolation in verse 20 beyond "which is poured out for you," though 1 Cor. xi. 25 (in spite of its not containing the words "which is poured out for you") seems clearly to be the source of the interpolation. Evidently early copyists, even when they tried their hands at the "dangerous work of harmonistic corruption," were not as worried as we are by discrepancies in the documents. Westcott and Hort remark that: "It should be observed that the harmonistic changes in the Western as in all other texts were irregular and unsystematic. Nor is it rare to find Western changes proceeding in an opposite direction; that is, to find paraphrastic or other impulses followed in the text of one Gospel in unconsciousness or disregard of the creation of new differences from the language of a parallel narrative."

From the above it will be seen how arbitrary is Dr. Hunkin's decision to base his reconstruction of the Last Supper first on St. Luke xxii. 14-18 and secondly on 1 Cor. xi. 24a and St. Mark xiv. 22 (p. 18). He accepts what he does accept from the Markan and Pauline accounts simply because this half-verse happens to have been added to the original Lukan account by the scribe who produced the Western text, and he omits the rest because the Western text of St. Luke does so. He allows that St. Luke omitted to mention the bread, since he has to bring this in from St. Mark and 1 Corinthians, yet insists that the cup mentioned by St. Luke was the only cup. The only reason for not bringing in also the Covenant-cup from St. Mark and 1 Corinthians is that the Western text did not bring it in. We have only St. Luke's authority for this first cup. Why prefer unsupported Luke above Mark supported (quite independently, as Hunkin admits) by 1 Corinthians? It is not enough to suggest that the Pauline version rests only on the developed tradition which St. Paul learnt at Antioch. Upon what does the Markan tradition rest? Was St. Peter, the authority behind St. Mark's Gospel,



also corrupted by the Church at Antioch? Or if we must leave out St. Peter, was St. Mark, who had watched the Church at Jerusalem from its earliest days, so ignorant of what really took place at the Last Supper and of the character of the fellowship-meals of the earliest Christians that he, too, failed to see that the developments at Antioch were accretions? As a Jew he should, on Hunkin's theory, have been horrified by the changes, yet we find him calmly relating that Jesus gave to His disciples a cup to drink, saying, "This is My Blood of the Covenant poured out for many." Further, we must allow some weight to the fact that the editor of the First Gospel thought that St. Mark's account was reliable. It is a glaring omission on Dr. Hunkin's part that he offers no explanation of the origin of the Markan text. According to him, the representing of the wine as the Lord's blood was "not a step that would have been natural to a Jew" (p. 19), but not difficult to imagine in a cosmopolitan city like Antioch. Were there, then, no Christian Jews at Antioch to object to this "unnatural" step? And why did the rest of the Church, as represented by 1 Corinthians and the Gospels of St. Mark and St. Matthew, and the whole Church as far as we can see, tamely accept this amazing development? Hunkin feels the need of some explanation of this, and attempts it as follows: "The fact that during this period Antioch maintained close relations with Jerusalem (Acts xi. 19, 22 ff., 27 ff., xii. 25) will help to explain why such a development did not rouse any serious opposition in the Mother Church. Relations with Antioch did become strained over the question of circumcision (Acts 15), but anything like an open breach was avoided by the conference at Jerusalem. This, indeed, may be the real significance of this conference, to which St. Luke himself evidently attaches immense importance. It was not in any sense an œcumenical council; it was simply a conference by means of which Antioch and Jerusalem were held together, and so successfully held together, that no serious question arose over such matters as the observance of the Lord's Supper" (p. 20). A glance at this "explanation" shows that it is no explanation at all. It ignores the fact that, even accepting Hunkin's theory of the origin of the sacramentalism of Antioch and St. Paul, this sacramentalism had appeared *before* the dispute about circumcision had broken out. This sacramentalism was, in Hunkin's opinion, offensive to a Jew, yet we are asked to believe that Christian Jews afterwards discovered a second obnoxious practice at Antioch and forced a Council to deal with it, but were mollified so completely on this later issue that they never seriously raised the earlier issue at all. Is this human nature? When men are at variance



they usually look for every stick that they may use on their opponents' backs. If there is anything that the New Testament makes certain it is that some Jewish Christians were ready to go to great lengths in resisting Gentile liberty from the Jewish Law. Being hostile to the Antiochene position on this question of Gentile liberty (*cf.* Gal. ii. 11 *ff.*), would they have failed to strengthen their case by drawing attention to the sacramental vagaries of Antioch? To have done so would very likely have turned the scales in their favour at the Council of Jerusalem. St. Peter and the rest could hardly have defended what they knew to be unhistorical and which ran counter to their ingrained ideas. To say that the sacramental development at Antioch "did not rouse any serious opposition" at Jerusalem is misleading. There is no evidence that it roused any opposition anywhere, unless, indeed, the omission of any account of the bread and Covenant-cup from St. Luke's\* and St. John's Gospels is indication of opposition. Now whatever the explanation of this omission may be, it does not seem possible to hold that the omission was made because of opposition to these sacramental ideas. St. Luke remained faithful to St. Paul to the end, and therefore could hardly have disagreed with him on this important issue. Obviously when he wrote the Acts St. Paul was still his hero. As for the Fourth Evangelist, surely St. John vi. cannot be reconciled with the view that he was opposed to the sacramental teaching of St. Paul (*vide infra*).

We turn now to Hunkin's suggestion that St. Paul took over uncritically, and perhaps carried a stage further, the teaching that had at Antioch changed the primitive fellowship-meal into a mysterious sacrament. Dr. Hunkin's admission that St. Paul was a high sacramentalist is valuable. "St. Paul," he says, "certainly regarded the bread and wine, when consecrated to represent the body and blood of our Lord, as sacred, to be handled and received with reverence. To use a modern phrase, they had become 'numinous' objects; not 'numinous' in their own right; 'numinous' because of their connexion with the divine Lord. . . . It is evident that St. Paul regards participation in the Lord's Supper as a peak point in Christian experience. . . . We may admit that St. Paul does lay great stress on the reverent use which must be made of the Bread itself and of the Wine itself. We may admit that 1 Cor. x. 3-4 implies the application to them of the terms 'spiritual food' and 'spiritual drink'" (pp. 25-27). Yet Dr. Hunkin thinks that in all this St. Paul was lamentably wrong, for he himself ends by proposing that the Cup should be taken out of the Consecration

\* ix. in its original form.



Prayer altogether, and have nothing but a simple grace said over it (p. 38). St. Paul, then, was miserably mistaken in his idea of what constituted "a peak point in Christian experience," for obviously if Hunkin's suggestion were adopted the cup would cease to be a "numinous" object and the experience which St. Paul associated with it would disappear. Can St. Paul really have gone wrong so badly? Christ had met him on the Damascus road and changed his life without the aid of rite or ceremony. Would he have fallen so easy a victim to a false sacramentalism, he who was steeped in Jewish tradition (Gal. i. 14; Acts xxvi. 4-5), and who knew the "pillars" of the Church at Jerusalem? Beset by opponents as he was, and anxious lest he should have run in vain (Gal. ii. 2), did he never trouble to enquire about the origin of this practice which he regarded as "a peak point in Christian experience"? It all seems most unlikely. We have, then, to swallow a double dose of extreme improbability if we accept Dr. Hunkin's theory. Firstly, there is the unlikelihood of a sacramental development at Antioch distasteful to Jews being accepted by Jewish Christians, including some of the Apostles (for Hunkin's theory demands this, though he seems not to notice this point), with so little demur that not a trace of dispute about it appears in the New Testament; and secondly, the improbability that St. Paul would have taken over this development uncritically, and perhaps carried it a stage further, again without exciting, as far as we can discover, any opposition. It is unlikely that the men who turned the world upside down were themselves turned upside down so easily. Critics sometimes write as if the Apostles were a group of nonentities from whose feeble hands the direction of affairs quickly passed, but St. Paul, himself not an inconsiderable figure, did not so think of them (see Gal. i. 18 to ii. 14; 1 Cor. ix. 1-6, xii. 28: "first Apostles").

We have found that the suggestion that either St. Paul or an unidentified prophet of Antioch created the Church's sacramental doctrine and practice is too improbable to be accepted. Yet the doctrine is there, as Hunkin admits, and it must have come from somewhere. Now the arguments that rule out St. Paul or the unnamed prophet as its creators surely rule out anyone else. No one, stepping into the stream of Christian tradition between Pentecost and the proclamation of this doctrine only about twenty years later to the Corinthians, and earlier elsewhere, could have diverted that tradition so notably yet with so little trace of disturbance. But this consideration brings us up against the necessity of allowing that the doctrine came from Jesus Himself. Do we still hesitate at the difficulty that the whole development was against the



Jewish grain—the drinking of blood even symbolically, for example? Perhaps it was; but Jews did accept it, and if it is conceivable that they accepted it at the hands of St. Paul or an unnamed prophet, is it not much more conceivable that they would have accepted it from Jesus? There is, in fact, no one else from whom they would have accepted it.

It is in the light of this conclusion that we must consider our last and most baffling problem. How came it about that St. Paul is our only original New Testament witness to the command to repeat the rite of the Upper Room? First let us try to remove a prejudice, expressed by Hunkin thus: "No formal loyalty, no observance or rite, however beautiful or sacred, was ever for one moment placed by Jesus on the same level as Judgment and the Love of God. . . . To put among the first of His commands 'Carry out this rite' is to do dishonour to His memory. Not such was the mind of Christ" (pp. 36-37). This, we venture to say, completely misunderstands the Catholic position. No one supposes that the Eucharist is on the same level as the Love of God. We say it is a most powerful witness to God's love and a potent generator of love for Him in ourselves. Nor does anyone put "Carry out this rite" among the first of our Lord's commands. What we say is that obedience to it comes first in the sphere of organized *worship*.

Yet the critical problem mentioned above remains and obstinately demands an answer. None of the answers we have hitherto met seems quite satisfactory. We can rule out definitely the old view that the received text of St. Luke xxii. 19-20 gives us independent testimony in corroboration of St. Paul's in 1 Cor. xi. 23-25. A glance at Bishop Gore's treatment of this issue will show the desperate nature of the diehard position. In *Belief in Christ* (1922) he defended the received text of St. Luke, arguing that verses 19b-20, which R.V. puts in the margin, had been purposely omitted by a copyist, probably from a desire not to have what looks like a double account of the giving of the cup. But surely a copyist inspired by this motive would have cut out the giving of the first cup, which conflicts with the other accounts, not that of the second cup, which agrees with them. This was Westcott and Hort's view, and evidently Gore came to see its force, for in *Can We Then Believe?* (1926) he abandoned this defence of the received text and expressed his inclination to adopt the shorter text of St. Luke xxii. (omitting verses 19b-20, as in R.V. m.) as original. This makes St. Luke end his account of the cup and the bread abruptly with the words, "This is My Body." Gore suggested that he was running short of space and therefore contented himself with giving simply the "key words" (*op. cit.*, p. 201).



But in the rest of the Gospel St. Luke does not write like one pressed for space, and it seems incredible to us that he left out such a short but important passage on this account. Then in July, 1927, Canon H. N. Bate, in a brilliant article in the *Journal of Theological Studies*, showed with reasonable certainty that the original text of St. Luke xxii. omitted the *whole* of verses 19-20—i.e., St. Luke had no mention of the Eucharist in his Gospel at all. So, in the *New Commentary* (1929), Bishop Gore accepted this last position. We are bound to admire the Bishop's characteristic candour and readiness to accept new light, even though we cannot adopt the explanation he offered of St. Luke's silence, which he attempted to account for thus: "We may conjecture that, writing at Rome, and intending his history of Christian origins for the reading of educated Romans, he thought it better to keep silence about the great sacrament, which could not be intelligible to them (the report of which became, in fact, the occasion of gross scandals), and simply recorded the preceding love-feast." On this we remark that in his Preface St. Luke is ostensibly addressing an instructed Christian, and says that he is writing that Theophilus might know the certainty of the things wherein he had been instructed. It is impossible to believe that at a date as late as that to which we are compelled to assign St. Luke's Gospel a Christian could have been instructed as fully as St. Luke's writings presuppose and yet not have been told anything about the Eucharist. Even if we change Theophilus into educated Romans with only a casual knowledge of Christianity, the suggestion that the Eucharist was omitted as likely to be unintelligible to them must be rejected. Surely the Eucharist would have been no harder to understand than the Virgin Birth or the Resurrection, both of which St. Luke records very fully. The same consideration rules out Bishop Hicks's suggestion (*The Fullness of Sacrifice*, 1930) that perhaps "St. Luke is merely summarizing what he knows to be familiar to every Christian, and, perhaps, deliberately abstaining from specifying what he knew must still be a stumbling-block outside Christian, or rather in Jewish, circles" (pp. 207-8). Professor J. M. Creed (*The Gospel according to St. Luke*, 1930), while allowing that St. Luke's account of the Last Supper is mainly dependent upon St. Mark's, argues that St. Luke did not regard the Last Supper as the origin of the Sacrament of the Lord's Body and Blood and therefore does not represent it to have been so. But can St. Luke have companied with St. Paul so long, and apparently so sympathetically, and yet have held a different view from St. Paul about the origin of that which St. Paul regarded as "a peak point in Christian experience"? If St. Luke did discover that the



Church's sacramentalism (especially St. Paul's) rested upon an unhistorical basis, presumably he made this discovery during, or not later than, his stay in Palestine while St. Paul was awaiting his trial, for if he had not made the discovery by that time, he was not likely to make it later on. But he was with St. Paul after this. Could he, after making this disconcerting discovery, have failed to discuss the matter with St. Paul, and would not this have driven St. Paul to examine, if he—*per impossibile*—had not already enquired into the matter, the real origin of what he once thought he had received "from the Lord"? Suppose St. Paul did search the matter out and found it even as St. Luke had said. He would, we may be sure, have at once withdrawn the kind of teaching we find in 1 Cor. xi. Yet there is no hint of any such withdrawal in St. Paul's latest writings, sent, we may note, to churches with which he was in close touch when he wrote 1 Corinthians, and to which he had undoubtedly given the same kind of sacramental teaching as he gave to the Corinthians. Nor could he have withdrawn such a notable part of his teaching without the withdrawal leaving its mark upon the text of 1 Corinthians and without its checking the spread of sacramental doctrine in the Church. After St. Paul had recanted, would St. Matthew's Gospel (and probably we should have to include St. Mark's Gospel in the question) have at a later date associated a sacramental teaching uncommonly like St. Paul's with the Last Supper itself? We think that Professor Creed is misleading when he says that "Luke writes in an age when Christian rites and Institutions are still in a fluid state. No fixed interpretation (of the Eucharist) has become normative" (p. 262). We allow that in Holy Baptism the Trinitarian formula in St. Matt. xxviii. 19 represents a development from a simpler formula "into Christ," but this was an *explication*, involving no real change in sacramental doctrine. Again, as regards the sacrament of Order, development was inevitable, inasmuch as the original rulers of the Church, the Apostles, could not live for ever. But here again there was change of outward form, not of sacramental principle. What we are asked to admit about the Eucharist, however, is that there was the creation of the sacrament out of an ordinary fellowship-meal, and it has not been shown that this would have been possible without causing any disturbance in the Church.

We have, of course, to remember that the silence of the Fourth Gospel about the institution of the Eucharist at the Last Supper also needs to be accounted for. This does not weigh heavily upon us, for in our view the Fourth Gospel is not on the same level as the Synoptic Gospels as a historical record. The



writer's attitude towards the history is so different that his silence here is less puzzling than that of St. Luke about the institution and the silence of the other two Synoptists about the command to repeat the rite. Those who regard the Fourth Gospel as a good historical source, however, must face the problem. Professor C. H. Turner, in the *New Commentary* (on St. Mark *ad loc.*), attempted a similar explanation to that of Gore on St. Luke. He wrote that "The words (This is My Body . . . My Blood) are so familiar that it is quite impossible for us to realize how the tremendous claim here made must have startled any outsider, however much in sympathy with the Christian ideal, into whose hands the Gospel may have come. John vi. 52 suggests the language that might have been used; and that may be why the Fourth Gospel, and perhaps the Third as well, omit the actual institution. It had become a Christian *Arcanum*, a 'mystery' in the strict sense, hidden from all but the initiated." We have seen that this explanation fails with the Third Gospel. It fails also with the Fourth Gospel. Would anyone who had read St. John's Prologue, and the accounts of the miracles at Cana and the Feeding of the Multitude, be "scandalized" further by an account of the Institution? Even if this risk had been before the Evangelist's mind, could he not have guarded against it by something clearer than vi. 53? Further, would a simple account of the Institution of the Eucharist have been judged likely to shock a reader by the writer of vi. 35-58, especially verses 46, 51, 53, and 58? Dalman, "Jesus-Jeshua" (*E.T.*, 1929), propounded a double explanation of the absence of the Institution from the Fourth Gospel. Firstly, he thinks, in St. John vi. our Lord is represented as "turning the minds of His hearers from earthly (though miraculous) bread, yea, even from the manna, the bread from heaven," and so "He could not have expressed on the last evening such thoughts in connexion with material bread and wine." The Fourth Evangelist, then, was bent on emphasizing that it is our Lord's Person that matters, "perhaps in opposition to a nascent tendency to over-emphasize the importance of the sign as such" (p. 90). His second explanation is that of Professor Turner dealt with above, except that Dalman adds that the decision of the Fourth Evangelist to avoid mention of the Institution led him also to divest the meal of its Passover character, and so he adopted the device of antedating the meal. In other words, for dogmatic reasons the Fourth Evangelist manipulated the history. This last point need not detain us, but we must deal with the first. The Fourth Evangelist must not be thought of as attacking the high sacramentalism of St. Paul. He accepts it, and tries to guard against a mis-



conception of it. But what is that misconception? Dalman thinks of a tendency to over-emphasize the sacramental sign. Hunkin supposes that some had come to "attribute a kind of automatic action to the consecrated bread itself and to the consecrated wine itself, apart from the spiritual condition of the recipient" (p. 34), so the Fourth Evangelist sets down the literalist language in vi. 51-58, and corrects it in verse 63, where the meaning is, "You must not take all this about eating and drinking as referring to literal eating and drinking with the mouth; the life-giving force is the spirit; and the sayings of the Word made flesh—they are spirit and they are life" (p. 36). A similar view is taken by Dr. Lock in the *New Commentary* (*ad loc.*). This explanation, however, seems to do less than justice to verse 62: "What then if ye should behold the Son of Man ascending where He was before?" The disciples are represented as having complained at the hardness of the saying about eating the flesh and drinking the blood, and the complaint is reasonable enough after verses 51-58. But Jesus' reply does not mean, "I am not really referring to eating and drinking at all, but to accepting My words." It means, "I am not referring to physical flesh and blood." The accepted view at the time was that life comes from the association of the blood with the flesh. Jesus is made to say that life comes, not from these material things, but from the Spirit, as was indeed proved by His being alive after death in a "spiritual body" which did not consist of "flesh and blood." The rest of verse 63 probably means, "The things about which I have been speaking to you—viz., My flesh and blood, are of the nature of spirit and are life." Burney, *Aramaic Origin of the Fourth Gospel* (pp. 108-9), takes the "things" to be the *eating* of the flesh and the *drinking* of the blood, but this is less satisfactory. The antithesis, then, is not between a carnal eating and a mere reception of Christ's sayings, but between a gross and a spiritual interpretation of the flesh and the blood. The Fourth Evangelist is not trying to wean his readers from sacramentalism, but only from a gross literalism, itself a declension from the earlier pure teaching.\*

We have still not found an explanation of the silence of the Fourth Gospel about the Institution. The corrective teaching just discussed could as easily have been grafted on to the narrative of the Last Supper as on to the miracle of the Feeding. Perhaps we must be content with Hunkin's suggestion that "The Lord's Supper was by this time a long-established institution, and there was no need for St. John to repeat the history

\* Cf. W. F. Howard, *The Fourth Gospel in Recent Criticism and Interpretation* (pp. 213-4).



of its origin." This suffices for the Fourth Gospel, which does not attempt to do more than select a few incidents of the Ministry for spiritual embellishment. It is different with the Synoptic Gospels, for although they do not pretend to describe every incident of the Ministry, they do give representative and key incidents and summarize the rest. Consequently, when Dr. A. E. J. Rawlinson, *St. Mark* (1925), merely says that "for St. Mark and his readers it goes without saying that Jesus was instituting a permanent sacrament" (p. 204), we feel that he is brushing aside a real difficulty. What that difficulty is will be made clear by another quotation from Gore: "If the words reported by Paul, 'This do in remembrance of Me,' do not recur in Mark and Matthew, that can have no other significance than that they had been so thoroughly understood from the first, and acted upon in the tradition of the churches, that their constant recitation had dropped out" (*New Comm.*, N.T., p. 295b). We urge, however, that it does not seem likely that this part of the Dominical words would drop out while the other part was retained, especially during the intensive missionary campaign of the Apostolic period. It would be necessary for Christian missionaries to explain *why* they celebrated the Eucharist, and it is incredible that their explanation would have failed to emphasize the Lord's command, supposing it to have been given. Further, the *services* of the Apostolic Church, being so largely for recent converts, would naturally stress, not omit, such words as "This do," etc., if they were part of the commonly received tradition. We may remark also that it is not the way of Liturgies easily to jettison old material, and when the material was words of our Lord it is nearly inconceivable that it would have been dropped.

An ingenious point is made by Dr. Goudge (*New Comm.*, N.T., p. 422). He argues that "the Lord's Supper, at which the Eucharist was instituted, was probably either a Passover-meal or a quasi-Passover meal held a day in advance. . . . Thus there would be nothing to cause surprise if no Gospel mentioned that the Eucharist was to be repeated; a Passover feast not to be repeated would be to Jews a contradiction in terms. . . . That the Lord did say, 'Do this in remembrance of Me,' St. Paul tells us, and there is every reason to believe him. But it was not strictly necessary that the Lord should say this; the repetition of a Passover goes without saying." But our question is, not whether Jesus *need* have said, "Do this," etc., but why, if He said this, the Synoptists did not say that He did.\* We have already shown that there was a very practical reason

\* Besides, if we must omit "Do this," Dr. Goudge's point would raise the question, Why was the Lord's Supper celebrated oftener than once a year?



for their saying so. A possible explanation is offered by Plummer (*St. Luke*, I.C.C., p. 498). He suggests that the command to repeat the rite was given by the Lord, not at the Last Supper, but after His Resurrection, just as He gave the Apostles their commission to preach and baptize, and explained the mystery of His life and death (Luke xxiv. 25-49). Paul and Luke would then combine the words of Jesus on two different occasions. We could not accept this in its entirety without modification, but as regards our present question we think that no one can rule out Plummer's suggestion as impossible. St. Luke says that Jesus in the Resurrection period spoke to His Apostles "the things concerning the Kingdom of God" (Acts i. 3). We note that the Church soon grasped the truth that the era of the Christian Church is the Messianic Age (see 1 Cor. xv. 24-28), so that some reference by Jesus to the Messianic Banquet would have been natural enough in the post-Resurrection period. We ourselves, however, feel compelled to admit the possibility (not the certainty) that the words "Do this," etc., do not go back in exactly this form to Jesus Himself. Yet they need not be a pure invention. The Essay on "The Origins of the Sacraments" by N. P. Williams in *Essays Catholic and Critical* (1926) will make this clearer for us. Dr. Williams maintains that the Synoptic Gospels are not really silent about the command to repeat the rite, for all three record our Lord's words about not again drinking wine until He should drink it new in the Kingdom of God (Mark xiv. 25; Mat. xxvi. 29; Luke xxii. 18). Now our Lord had predicted that some who heard Him would live to see the Kingdom of God come with power (Mark ix. 1), so plainly He expected the Kingdom to appear in some sense within a measurable time. Dr. Williams argues that by the kingdom our Lord meant the new dispensation of grace inaugurated by His death, resurrection, and ascension. In other words, the coming of the Kingdom of God with power was the setting forth of the Church equipped with the Spirit and the Sacraments. Our Lord, like the Apocalyptists (*cf.* Isaiah xxv. 6; Enoch lxii. 14), had been accustomed to speak of the bliss of the Messianic period under the figure of a banquet, and probably "rehearsed" this Messianic Banquet with His followers. At any rate, the Last Supper was a rehearsal and anticipation of it, and our Lord said, "The next time we celebrate this rite will be in the Kingdom of God." This amounted, says Dr. Williams, to an affirmation that the rite would be repeated in the Church, "and such an affirmation, made by one who believed Himself to be the King-designate, is the equivalent of a command" (*op. cit.* p. 406; *cf.* Rawlinson, *St. Mark*, pp. 205-6). This explanation has the merit of turning the flank



of those who argue that Jesus was dominated by the apocalyptic idea that the end of the age was at hand and that He could therefore not have thought of instituting a Church or sacraments. The theory, however, seems open to the criticism that in the Synoptic saying just discussed our Lord speaks of drinking the new wine in the Kingdom Himself, yet there has never been a tradition in the Church that Jesus drinks the wine of the Eucharist. Perhaps we should say that the passage really means, "This is the last rehearsal of the Messianic Banquet. Soon we shall celebrate the real thing together in the Kingdom of God." Our Lord, we hold, is our Host at the Eucharist in a double sense.

But even if we accept Dr. Williams's exposition, we still have no explanation of the omission of the words, "This do," etc. Dr. Williams himself thinks (p. 402) that no explanation is needed. The Synoptists, having recorded the "fruit of the vine" saying, might well have thought it unnecessary to record the command, "This do," etc. But surely they were writing so that Christians might better understand the Christian way, and they would hardly decide to record a saying the meaning of which is not at all clear and to omit a perfectly clear saying uttered on the same occasion. We are inclined to allow that the words, "This do," etc., are a Pauline paraphrase of the "fruit of the vine" saying, designed to make explicit its meaning.\* Or perhaps a combination of Dr. Plummer's and Dr. Williams's theories provides the best solution.

The lengths to which opponents of the traditional theory of the origin of the Eucharist will go can be judged from an Essay by Dr. Rendel Harris entitled *Eucharistic Origins* (1927). He notes that the agreement between *all* the accounts of the Institution is confined practically to the statements:

Jesus took a cup and gave thanks over it.

Jesus took bread and gave thanks over it, and said, "This is My Body."

Now "the Gospels show clearly that the breaking of bread and its benediction was the ordinary habit of Jesus at meal-times, so that it is not a sacrament at all" (p. 14). It is therefore possible that the reference to the bread ought to be removed from the Institution (we note the complete difference from Dr. Hunkin's view). The statement that Jesus took a cup and said, "This is My Body," seems at first sight absurd, but Dr. Harris offers the following explanation: "The great sacrament of the Aryan race is the 'brewing of Soma,' the drink of the gods, of which whosoever drinks with the gods and under the direction of the gods will, like them, become immortal" (pp. 6-7). Now

\* St. Paul, of course, does not record the "fruit of the vine" saying. If he had consciously paraphrased it he would naturally omit it.



"Since *Soma* is the great Aryan sacrament, and has come down even to our own times, we can, by reading it in the text without the change of a single letter, get rid of the absurdity of the equation between the 'cup' and the 'body,' for there is no difficulty in the cup being a Soma cup. This, then, was what Jesus said and did:

He took a cup and said, "This is My Soma."

What He meant was that the end was come and immortality was at hand" (pp. 15-16). The disciples, of course, only partially understood what He meant, and "from that partial misunderstanding sprang, in a little while, the 'Hoc est corpus meum' and the Mass" (p. 16). Our Lord said Soma, meaning the Aryan sacred drink, and they thought He said *σῶμα*, His Body.

The rest of Dr. Rendel Harris's exposition is too allusive to be clear, but he seeks to account for the introduction of the bread into the Christian sacrament somewhat as follows: In the ancient Egyptian cult of Osiris we have the familiar figure of a dying and rising god, Osiris in this case being identified with the Nile with its annual rise and fall. The Nile made the grain to grow, and so Osiris as it were became bread. He is pictured supine on a bier with grain growing from his body, so that he seems to point to the grain and say "This is My Body." The very name of Osiris as identified with the Nile, viz., Hapu, was explained by the priests to mean, "This is the body." In the Osirian Mysteries two vases of water and two cakes of bread from the new corn were carried into the sanctuary and ceremonially consumed, and there may have been a third cake which was broken into pieces to symbolize the god whose body was broken into pieces in the Osirian Myth. These Mysteries had been practised for 4,000 years, and "the story became familiar and passed into folk-lore all over Europe. It was, therefore, quite easy and natural for a Christian illustration and expansion to be given to the oracular statement that 'this is My Body.' The Gospels themselves are in evidence, and especially the Fourth Gospel, that attempts were made to dress Christ in the robes of Osiris" (p. 33).

Dr. Harris recognizes that his theory is open to "a very damaging fire of objections," and sets out some of them himself. He allows that the word Soma in the Aryan sense has not been found in Greek or Syriac, but "Perhaps this is also part of our ignorance and means that we have never looked for it, or have looked in the wrong direction" (p. 19). We suggest that it has not been found because it is not there. Again, Dr. Harris allows that there is no evidence that Jesus ever had contact with Indo-Iranian thought, but urges that India and Persia



may have sent their influence along the trade routes as far as the Mediterranean. We do not know, either, how Jesus spent the greater part of His life. How can we say that He never made a journey to the East? "One such Eastern journey would explain the allusion to Soma" (p. 18). We venture the simpler explanation that the allusion originated in the fertile imagination of Dr. Rendel Harris. To the objection that Jesus probably spoke in Aramaic, not in Greek, as this theory demands, Harris replies that the Lukan play on words out of *πάσχα* and *πάσχω* in *τοῦτο τὸ πάσχα πρὸ τοῦ με παθεῖν*, and the recent discovery of Jesus' words to Judas (Matt. xxvi. 50) *ἐταῖρε ἐφ' ᾧ πάρει* on first-century Eastern drinking cups show that Jesus spoke Greek on that occasion. What he does not really attempt to do, however, is to account for the words, "This is My Blood," etc. The Pauline version of them appears about twenty-five years after the crucifixion, but as a reminder of the same teaching given about five years earlier. Thus Dr. Rendel Harris's theory requires us to believe that at this very solemn moment Jesus was thinking in terms of a foreign religion but did not trouble to make this clear to His disciples; that within twenty years Egyptian influence had combined with the misunderstanding to bring in the bread; that words associated with the cup had been transferred to the bread, and words (distasteful to Jews, by the way) invented instead for the cup; that Jesus' statement that He was about to attain to immortality had become the institution of a mysterious sacrament to be perpetually celebrated; and that all this development had been accepted by the whole Church, including some of those who were at the Last Supper, without leaving any trace of dispute about it in the New Testament. It is not at all clear that Dr. Harris believes his theory himself, and we hope we shall be excused for finding it wholly incredible. We reject it the more confidently because Dr. Harris frankly reveals the prejudices that make him unable to accept or tolerate the orthodox view. Thus after stating his theory he remarks that: "We may be thankful that nothing of a sacerdotal character and nothing of a sacramental intention on Jesus' part is left to us, superimposed on the simple memorial of the night in which He was betrayed" (pp. 19-20). And again, "It would certainly simplify our creeds and practices if we could be sure that Jesus never established a sacrament at all." It would indeed.

Whatever be the explanation of the problems connected with the records of the Institution and particularly of the command to repeat the rite, we think that we have shown that any attempt to find a creator of the Sacrament of the Lord's Body and Blood other than Jesus breaks down under the diffi-



culties raised by the attempt itself. On the other hand, the theory of Dominical institution, though not free from perplexities, is not beset by improbabilities. It explains naturally, as no other theory explains, the fact that we find the Sacrament in possession and nowhere spoken against within twenty years of the Lord's death. It is also the unbroken tradition of the Church, and we therefore accept it.

A. E. MORRIS.

### CATHOLICISM AND A LITERARY PHILOSOPHER

SURPRISE is sometimes expressed at the number of *litterati*, particularly men, more notably in France than in England, who have recently returned to Catholicism. In France the issue is clearer, for the only religious alternative there is L'Église Réformée, which, seen even in André Gide's charming *Alissa*, of *La Porte Étroite*, cannot avail to win homing souls from their childhood's faith. In England, a bewildering chaos of cults blurs the issue between faith and scepticism, a fact patent to sympathizers with either. One of the latter, M. Léon Pierre-Quint, in a recent book, spends a score of bitter pages on converts—Jammes, Maritain, Péguy, Psichari, and, not least, on the subject of these pages, Jacques Rivière, stressing Claudel's share in it all, allowing himself to write:

Comme Dieu et Satan, dans l'imagerie populaire, Claudel et Gide semblaient se disputer une âme: l'âme du petit professeur timoré qu'était alors Rivière.\*

No one conversant with all the facts will dispute the part played by the great poet, Paul Claudel, now France's Ambassador to the U.S.A. All the same, it is not as one of a throng, nor on account of any clearer issue or shining literary gift that Rivière is of peculiar interest, but because he is a signal instance of Catholicism's power to recover and hold, not the merely forlorn, not the sentimentalist, not the æsthete, but—far more kittle cattle—the philosophically inclined, who observe carefully, think lucidly, realize the implications of a rational process, and are willing to risk all to follow it to its conclusion. Besides being a philosopher, whose death at thirty-nine deprived the world of one much needed, Rivière was a literary critic of insight and imagination. It is idle to pit the value of an intellectual against the "silly sheep"; holiness, spirituality, we all know, are found at times in the child, the illiterate, the irrevocably uneducated. But the highly gifted and learned have

\* *André Gide, sa Vie, son Œuvre*, par Léon Pierre-Quint, 1933, p. 73.



souls. *All souls are mine!* There is no essential hierarchy; the difference is in service, in a world which needs alike a country Maiden, St. Paul and a Fisherman.

Rivière was born in 1886. At the Lycée Lakanal, in 1905, he and Henri Alain Fournier met. Until the War's outbreak, these two, one an incipient poet, the other predestined to philosophy, corresponded whenever they were parted, often lengthily, about their aims and interests, about current literature galore, and Rivière about his passionately loved "philo." These letters, 1,515 pages, were published in 1930 by Madame Isabelle Rivière, the philosopher's widow, the poet's sister. Most revealing, in intention urgently personal and private, they could not have appeared in the lifetime of either writer. Does another document, so significant as to the attitude to life of two boys gifted greatly beyond the average, exist in this century's opening decades? Their frankness, their single-minded effort to "get at" their own real selves as part of that whole truth of things which from boyhood they strove to discover, seem to relieve even a decent-minded reader from that sense of eaves-dropping so inseparable from the perusal of published private letters.

Madame Rivière's short preface to vol. iii. contains these words:

"Reader, when you have followed to the impassable threshold these two souls whom we deliver to you so tremblingly—so great is our fear that you will not care enough for them—do not abandon them there. If you have learned to love them, you will make them the one only offering which can reach them now. It is now . . . that the prayers they forgot or neglected must be said, *it is now that they themselves plead with you, to pray for them daily, ceaselessly, never forgetting them.*"\*

Those, if any, who find that exaggerated may reflect that sometimes quality matters, not quantity. There are so many average people—however seldom most of us admit our own share in that crowd: there are so few lives devoted to the pursuit of truth in itself. The worth to the world of wholly sincere intelligence outpasses all arithmetical reckoning.

Only Rivière can be dealt with here, partly for reasons of space, mostly because he was a philosopher; who is not only less chargeable than a poet with emotion, but who is, among all humans, "philosophic Doubt's" foredoomed prey. So, when he believes and practises, sceptics take heed.

His widow, in one of the brief prefaces, says of his upbringing:

\* The aim of this essay being to present the substance, not the literary charm of these letters, for the convenience of some, passages quoted are translated.



"God!—he had been brought up by his mother in closest intimacy with Him . . . he had learned to lean on Him in every happening, to pray to Him, to take His counsel, to receive His inspirations."\*

The actual sentence is the hero's, in Rivière's unpublished *Roman*, "Florence," which Madame Rivière knew to be autobiographical. Rivière and Fournier, having rendered their military service, were called up in 1914. The former was captured early in September, and imprisoned until June, 1917. Fournier was "not found" after the battle of September 22, 1914. From 1919 to his death in 1925, Rivière edited *La Nouvelle Revue Française*.

Between February, 1907, and January, 1914, Rivière, in great spiritual distress, corresponded with Claudel, then Consul at Tientsin: the letters have been published; in them, M. Pierre-Quint seems to have found—alone surely—"l'âme du petit professeur timoré."

*A la Trace de Dieu*, with an Introduction by Isabelle Rivière and a Preface by Claudel, appeared in 1925. His wife wrote:

"At Koenigsbrück, some of the prisoners—engineers, accountants, booksellers—gathered round him. Together, to prevent mental stagnation, they organized a series of Discussions, not set lectures, but rather conversations, previously prepared, when each in turn talked of what he knew best. Jacques Rivière chose to speak to them about God."†

This book, of 348 pages, contains very full "Notes" for these Discussions; while the last 140 pages are extracts from the various pocket-books, where he wrote down intimately, often profoundly, the details of that prison life which at Koenigsbrück and later at Hülseberg galled him almost intolerably. One must suffice:

"How good it is to be with God! What a friend in this loneliness. If I had not Him to guarantee my future, to assure me that I shall find my lost treasures again, what would become of me? Had I no promise but Reason's I could not bear it another moment."‡

On December 10, 1916, he wrote more desperately still:

"O God, I cry to Thee; grant me to leave this as soon as may be. . . . Snatch me from this terrible place."§

These were written in prison's realities, not as "literary" recollections. These volumes, with his *Études* (not pertinent to the present inquiry, but notable through his brilliant exposition of that most elusive of writers, Gide), are the whole of his work so far as it has been published.

\* *Correspondance: Jacques Rivière et Paul Claudel*, p. 1 (afterwards referred to as R. and P. C.).

† *A la Trace de Dieu*, p. 7.

‡ *Ibid.*, June 18, 1915, p. 273.

§ *Ibid.*, p. 238.



To realize his religious outlook at College, return must be made to his wife's account of his early upbringing, his youthful intimacy with God:

"But his Mother died when he was only ten; the tortures and impulses of youth, disgust with a bourgeois, comfortable type of Christianity, the pride of great intelligence supervened to hide the presence of God from him. . . . But he could not endure deprivation of that Presence. That he never succeeded in living without or apart from God, this despair, these appeals, whose childish grandiloquence occasionally remind us that he was but twenty, are a tiny proof."\*

No one can follow, seriously and carefully, Rivière's philosophic and religious growth without perceiving this break, at adolescence, away from childhood's training; and, which is vital, without recognizing too the fundamental texture of his intellectual make-up; most specially, his literal passion for "reality." Not only in religion, but in literature, philosophy, everywhere always, he was sincere. Two things only he desires: facts, and to be wholly sincere. At nineteen, writing to Fournier, temporarily in hospital, about the author Maeterlinck, then absorbing his mind, he urged:

"the important point is, not that a man loves *symbolisme*, music, the moderns, but that he should think *sincerely*, according to the steady direction of his heart and intelligence."†

Again:

"To be one's own real self . . . and not to make one's life into literature,"

where, plainly he uses "literature" as Verlaine did, when he separated Art's essence from literary trifling:

"et tout le reste est littérature !"

Paul Valéry, more subtly, touches this still growing weakness in contemporary literature, in England as in France:

"The evident defect in all literature of never satisfying the entire spirituality."‡

In the notes of his prison discussion on *The Nature of Modern Science* Rivière summed up his vehement conception of reality: "Les faits ne se laissent pas vaincre,"§ a plea not easily translatable. The subject of this essay being his return to religion, the greatness and variety of his gifts and interests, therefore,

\* R. and P. C., p. ii.

† *Correspondance: J. Rivière et A. Fournier*, vol. i., p. 10 (afterwards called Cor.: J. R. and A. F.).

‡ *Variété*, p. 177.

§ *A La Trace de Dieu*, p. 150.



at least this once, his view of poetry, must be stressed. Writing to Fournier on a medley of philosophical matters, in January, 1906, he said:

"To wish poetry to be philosophical is to mistake its function. Because, like music, poetry (rightly estimated) is the extension of philosophy, extension into the unconscious."\*

Then, hitting at a contemporary clique, *Les Intégralistes*, whose name suggests that, like Bacon, they "took all knowledge for their province," he stakes out his own philosophical claim:

"They are abstract poets: they fling themselves recklessly into the universal (*le général*). But that, the universal, is precisely what I claim; it is my job to make it perceptible to feeling (*sensible au cœur*); and I will not permit the poets, who have so much else on hand, to meddle with it."†

So, this philosopher warns the Poets; surely not without a sly hint to Henri himself? He had already stated his interpretation of the Universal:

"Real reality is, for me, universal. That is to say, I 'think universals,' by giving them a certain colour, a certain life, a certain beauty, all very precise. As a painter sees, so I think in terms of sense. . . . Another proof of my passion for universality is that perpetually I try to classify, to set in order, hence to abstract, in order to reach those synthesized perceptions which most delight me."‡

Yet, three months on, he confesses to doubting reality in itself:

"All this assumes that I believe that there is—apart from visions we may have of it, and adjusting these visions' accuracy—reality in itself. Now, of such reality, I am not in the least certain. I even vehemently doubt it. . . . I must insist that, at bottom, *my* passion is to see accurately."§

No one who spent youth in philosophic tangles will gibe at Rivière's obvious contradictions, of which he was fully aware. The profoundest things are neither quickly nor easily cleared up.

At this time he was fulfilling his, to him, hateful year of compulsory military service. Yet, with his accustomed "reality" he came to appraise its differing values justly. In the leisure moments of this slavery he consoled himself with snatches of philosophy:

"shall I ever arrive at the essential synthesis, at the centre?"||

\* Cor.: J. R. and A. F., vol. i., p. 10.

† *Ibid.*, p. 223.

|| *Ibid.*, p. 175.

† *Ibid.*, vol. i., p. 235.

§ *Ibid.*, pp. 162, 163.



His passion for fact, his philosophic bent, his deliberate exactness demand all this emphasis, because this judicious, non-emotional approach to and handling of vital ultimates makes his return to Catholicism by that much the more impressive to all, however comparatively few, whose difficulties, methods, and doubts resemble his.

His friendship with Fournier cannot be considered here, there is not space: but one passage, dated from barracks at Saint-Médard near Bordeaux, where he served with the 144th Infantry, deserves to be quoted for the light it sheds on the philosopher as on the poet. If anyone finds it not "very English," let him remember it was addressed not to him but to Henri:

"I have so many things held over to say to you. I long to have you with me. I want you here, with your likenesses and differences, with your understanding ways and your quick sympathy. I want us, side by side, to go chasing shades (*nuances*), universals, ideas, sensations. I want to tell you things I should repent of directly I had said them, and which I should qualify bit by bit, as you listened. Delicious joy of changing one's self by growing more complete. I want to hear your sensitive, delicate, poetical talk. And for my pride's sake, I want you to encourage and flatter me, to tell me something about my real worth, which I am so solitary in comprehending."\*

Quite suddenly, in 1907, in his religious struggle, Rivière turned, after reading his books for a year—the great dramas, the philosophical *Co-naissance du monde et de soi-même*, the exquisite collection of Far-Eastern Vignettes, *Connaissance de l'Est*—to Paul Claudel. This remarkable poet and great State servant, eighteen years Rivière's senior, had returned to the Catholic Church in 1886. The correspondence, showing the stages of a struggle, hardly hinted to Henri, continued till 1914. Probably the youth's passion for fact misled Claudel into overlooking the truly synthetic trend of his mind. Anyhow, in his Preface to *A La Trace de Dieu*, Claudel wrote:

"Rivière was no mystic, he was not even a philosopher. As I sometimes told him, and my remark seemed to please him, he was—owing to his fundamental honesty of nature, by his preoccupation with objectivity—a *savant* first and foremost. The wish for explanation was less in him than the taste for sheer fact. His writings are full of analyses—of particular temperaments or general phenomena—but analyses; of a breadth and delicacy quite remarkable. He possessed the gentleness, sympathy, patience, lack of bias, the art of putting a question, of dwelling with his subject-matter, which belongs to all great observers" (p. 10).

Then, perhaps unconsciously, he retracts his verdict that Rivière was "no philosopher."

"He had as well a desire for discussions and proofs."†

\* Cor.: J. R. and A. F., vol. ii., pp. 173, 174.

† *A La Trace de Dieu*, p. 13.



Surely those mark both philosopher and *savant*? At any rate, philosophical matters crop up constantly, throughout this correspondence. In his third letter to Claudel, Rivière, now twenty-one, writes:

"Only! that is the terrible word in Christianity that scares me most, against which I most rebel. O! I long to believe the truth of this admirable teaching, which, in your dramas, has made me shed tears out of sheer love. But why *the* truth, and the only truth? Why this and no other? Why not innumerable truths, to which, in turn, we might pay all our devotion?"\*

This twentieth-century conception of many kinds of fundamental truth was no attitude of their immediate predecessors. That truth might be to men unattainable, Herbert Spencer insisted. Disputants had argued about the Unknowable, heedless of the term's verbal and real self-contradiction. In the eighties, Henry Sidgwick, seeking truth, undercut the foundations with his relentless dialectic, till some of his scanty band of young listeners felt life had become bitter beyond words, when they could find no cogent reply to that devastating exposition; so much the more destructive, because its Expositor was eminent in all the virtues, and always manifestly, unalterably anxious to believe in the Christianity he was undermining. To Rivière, that peculiar pain was not allotted. In May, 1907, Claudel wrote briefly:

"One more little dose of philosophy to answer your idea of several possible Truths. God *alone* exists, I mean, in a special sense, exists by Himself: other things and beings exist only by an act of His will (as St. Paul says). There is only one God, therefore only one Truth, since the two terms are synonymous. . . . Where God is not, Truth is not: where there is no being, there is nothing."†

In the same letter to which Claudel is here replying, Rivière had also urged an æsthetic difficulty, allied to Claudel's plea, "one only God, therefore only one Truth." He had written:

"You calmly require a terrible thing of me. You say 'There are so many things which to you seem infinitely sweet, or terribly desirable, which you will have to renounce.' Yes! and just that overwhelms me. Really and truly, it means I never again may love, or even know—this pleasure, that one, and, yet again, this other: all smiling enchantingly at one, with an irresistible face, and a look one cannot tear from one's heart. . . . Realize that I am a man whose breath is taken away by every kind of loveliness; a man who finds each thing's sheer reality a delicious invasion, an overflowing fulness. You condemn me to a stripping which, to me, spells death, not initiation into true life."‡

Nor is that all. Rivière's temperament was unusually complex. Philosophically, he refused everything falling short

\* R. and P. C., p. 37.

† *Ibid.*, p. 48.

‡ *Ibid.*, p. 39.



of reality, of fact. In his correspondence with Fournier that incessantly appears. Years later, in his prison pocket-books, he wrote, "I never lie." Similarly in this letter to Claudel he said:

"At the bottom of everything I have a tremendous desire, a so real desire for certitude; a vehement longing for sincerity."\*

Free from all tendency "to turn life into literature," he was equally immune from rationalistic chill: "My passion is to see accurately," so he once wrote to Fournier. Secondly, this man whose "breath" was "taken away by every kind of loveliness," cherished "*la passion du beau*"† as intensely as the most ardent *Parnassien*. Thirdly, most important here, his difficulty sprang not only from hyper-intellectuality + æsthetics, but had an ethical, a spiritual element. For Claudel, he paints this crudely, some may say blasphemously, but nothing shall be burked here, even if it repels, because the special stimulus and example afforded by this singular youth to all, today, whose difficulties are, not a pose, but real, depends largely on his reader's ability to accept his secret as frankly as he reveals it, if some find it lacking in reserve, even indecent. As these most intimate secrets are unfolded, let such reflect that Rivière and Fournier were both dead before their letters were printed: and further, that to believe or not to believe is a matter of vital moment. What saint, what penitent sinner—St. Augustine, to wit—practised reserve when life and death were the issue? Finally, this avowal was not lightly proffered, nor to an incompetent recipient. Here it is apt to quote Claudel's self-description:

"It horrifies me if anyone can suppose . . . I am a kind of saint. I am nothing but a mere simple fellow, full up with the bothers and burdens of family life; enjoying in a commonplace bourgeois fashion the good things of this life and the next."‡

As a rule, he wrote to Rivière quietly, soberly, coming down very gently on the boy's turbulent, chaotic passions. Even the sentence which wrenched out Rivière's ultimate confession is a commonplace to instructed Christians:

"If you fall, do not despair, but keep imperturbable faith in God, remembering that it is not the most shameful sins which are the most pernicious. (God) hates only pride. *Cor contritum et humiliatum non despicias.*"§

Moved by Rivière's horror of proffered "death" in lieu of "initiation," Claudel ended on a compassionate note:

"Poor boy! so you, in your turn, are caught in Christ's toils. *Induxisti nos in laqueum.* 'Thou hast beguiled us into a mousetrap.' "||

\* R. and P. C., p. 40.

† R. and P. C., p. 90.

‡ Sully Prudhomme.

§ *Ibid.*, p. 51.

|| *Ibid.*, p. 52.



"Tu nous as introduits dans une souricière"—how charming, how French a rendering of the Psalmist. He continues:

"I understand your terror at the sight of this new world, because, and there is no way of concealing it from you, there is a great renunciation to make—viz., of freedom to do and to think precisely as you please. Moreover, whoever knows where God's demands will stop?—His, of whom Holy Writ says, 'He is harder than hell.' It is not surprising if your flesh trembles where the greatest saints have shuddered."\*

It was this which brought Rivière's violent admission:

"It is all over. I have told you everything. Already you despise me, find me outside the pale, lost in the world, negligible henceforth for ever. Nevertheless, explanation of the incompatibility I discover between this self of mine and God is due to you. It was you who, without ever suspecting it, pronounced my sentence: 'He hates only pride; *Cor contritum et humiliatum non despiciet*.' Till then, I had not realized that supremely, essentially, profoundly, I am proud. . . . I have lived so intimately, so inextricably interwoven with my pride as to be unaware of it. . . . Every gesture, every thought, every word is just that. And, you will say to yourself, that since I have so discerned this evil thing, since I see it so plainly, I am already saved. But no: because I refuse, my whole being refuses, to call it an evil thing. How could I? It would be denying my innermost self, because 'myself' is that, nothing else—pride, the whole of myself is pride, my very essence is pride. Actually, I live in bottomless enjoyment of my own selfhood, of my pride: enjoyment of what you consider my plague-spot."†

Unflinchingly, he confesses that this supreme self-worship began in infancy, tainting his youthfullest religion;‡ that it follows him still in the presence of the Blessed Sacrament:

"When I bend my knee I do not bend my soul."§

With all youth's assurance, he insists, "I shall never change," yet he does change, by a qualification, on the very next page. Deeper, more rooted in that "self" than even this terrifying pride, was his undying passion to reach "reality," to express Truth. The intellect which endangered him also bore the seed of his eventual rescue:

"In spite of myself, because I needs must be frank, I have in all this that I have written exaggerated my fault. I am still persuaded that God exists: I acknowledge that I am weltering in the unknowable, in an ineffable mystery: only, I decline to choose God before myself."||

Pride! Yet not quite as before. Though in his struggle and muddle he does not, for some years will not, see it, this, viewed with words which follow:

"I do not believe that He asks of us any other thing than the perfect, unbroken development of our very self—seems at least some tribute to God and His will.

\* R. and P. C., p. 52.

§ *Ibid.*, p. 76.

† *Ibid.*, pp. 73, 74.

|| *Ibid.*, p. 80.

‡ *Ibid.*, p. 78.



Also a flicker of his later humility flashes transiently:

"You see, I am not impiously irreverent; perhaps we can go on discussing without rancour: sometimes, even may understand one another. Do not throw me over utterly. Keep your promise to answer all my letters, to explain things to me always, to encourage me."\*

Grilling in wearisome manœuvres at Bordeaux, just before his release from service, Rivière, like a small child, added: "I am going to read all the books you suggested." Here is the "suggestion":

"All Pascal . . . Angelo of Foligno, Ruysbroeck, St. Teresa, *Lives of the Saints*, shockingly though they are written; Anne Catherine Emmerich . . . Dante, and all you can of Newman. . . . And the Bible, which it is essential you should read from end to end. . . . St. Thomas . . . when you can, not all at once, it would take you years."†

And what of Claudel's reply? How could Rivière ever have doubted? Could the creator of *Tête d'Or*, *Cœuvre*—could the poet who understood Violaine, and later would draw Synge de Coûfontaine, cast off a soul so sincere, in such acute pain? Mercifully, he was wise and charitable. Earlier he had warned the boy:

"Do not ever imagine that I can reply precisely to your doubts. There will always be a region of the battle where you must go alone: thorns which you can only blunt by handling them."‡

His answer to Rivière's lacerating appeal is instinct with affectionate good sense:

"My dear friend, I have just had your two Letters of July 4 and 5. Divest yourself of the fancy that you have told me terrible, irremediable things; that I shall throw you over, that all is finished and done between us. . . . That a young man of your age should shudder before inexorable truth, before the concessions and renunciations demanded, is not in the least surprising. . . . God will choose His own hour with you, whether the first or the eleventh: I was mistaken in being in a greater hurry than He."§

Before approaching Claudel, Rivière had soaked himself in his books, honestly rating him, not only as a Christian, but as the first of France's living thinkers and poets. This man, whose friendship he now prizes, quietly proposes to share what blame exists. Disarming generosity! Yet, knowing how quickly a soul relieved from strain may slip back, Claudel hits Rivière's lively pride a shattering hammer-stroke of cool sense:

"Pride is no sign of strength, but of weakness. The Fathers call it *spiritual luxury*, and compare the proud to the effeminate of whom the prophets speak."||

\* R. and P. C., p. 81.

† *Ibid.*, p. 68.

§ *Ibid.*, pp. 86, 87.

† *Ibid.*, pp. 49, 51, 52.

|| *Ibid.*, p. 88.



Next, knowing his man, he ladles him out this astringent dose:

"On re-reading your letter, I observe you believe in God: but you prefer a discreet God: not importunate and comfortably unknowable! *The perfect development of your own self!* There is no perfect and unbroken development save that which is fitly adapted to its end: which end, for man, is God. Man was not made by himself, not for himself; but by God, and for God."\*

Here is the point on which St. Ignatius Loyola built *The Spiritual Exercises*.

Released from the army, helped by Claudel's insight and *caritas*, Rivière let slip some of his intellectual pride. The struggle, henceforward, took an ethical turn. In his last Bordeaux letter, he plunged into the nakedest negation, centring round a thought, however, which has restored faith to some:

"I admit that Catholicism is the *only* explanation . . . that alone it makes sense of Nature. But why should there be such an explanation? Why should Nature make sense? . . . What obliges me to believe that there is good and evil, high and low, beautiful and ugly?"†

A straight challenge follows:

"Allow me to say that you seem to assume a crowd of ideas *a priori* which can all be subsumed under this argument: In order that I need not despair, there must be sense in what I see; therefore there is sense in what I see."‡

On, he throws himself, into sheer nothingness:

"I do not pretend to overthrow values, to call evil good and *vice versa*: I simply deny them, and also the Principle of Contradiction. Quite naturally, I believe that a thing can at once be and not be; and that my incapacity to understand how matters little."§

If, with his passion for reality, and his clear perception of its distinctness from "seeming," Rivière could "quite naturally believe" thus, how came he to boggle at even the profoundest difficulties of faith?

Replying admirably, Claudel remarked that, like some others, Rivière had mistaken Kant, muddling thereby subjective and objective. He presented him with seven considerations:

1. Utter negation is excluded by Rivière's admission of his *own* suffering.
2. The goal of the human heart and spirit lies beyond this world.
3. We actually find an "inherent order" in "things."
4. The world is not wholly "disordered": only in a particular way; not by the presence, but by the absence of something.

\* R. and P. C., p. 81.

† *Ibid.*, p. 94.

‡ *Ibid.*, pp. 93, 94.

§ *Ibid.*, p. 95.



5. The distinction between subject and object is not absolute, since a "state" of the subject (self) is as authentic an "object" of research as, e.g., any bit of some insect's make-up.

6. (A vital plea:) No one, therefore not Rivière, can point to anything, save man, whose goal is not attainable in this present world (which resembles Kant's claim for the validity of the idea of immortality).

7. "So-called Kantians" erect innumerable "antagonistic realities," which are not really mutually exclusive.

Having elucidated these points (pp. 104-108), Claudel concludes:

"Where sense-perception ends, *ought* begins: but we are never left without a guide. . . . Your solipsism will not take you far. Here is the point where reason stops, where revelation goes forth to meet it."\*

Rivière's passion for fact had not saved him from overlooking something, neither explicable nor to be explained away: Kant's clumsily named Categorical Imperative. Sidgwick met it in the tiny word "ought," whose meaning he pursued through pages of *The Methods of Ethics*.† There, as in his lectures, in the Divinity Schools at Cambridge, he left it at last:

"this fundamental notion must, I conceive, be taken as ultimate and unanalysable."

"What obliges me to say," Rivière asked, "there is good and evil?" as if he were sure of the answer, "Nothing!" Yet before the single word "ought," Sidgwick, most destructive of analytic dialecticians, halted; Kant paralleled "the starry skies above me and the Moral Law within me"; Claudel insists that "where reason stops, revelation goes forth to meet it." Rivière, again like some others, had made a further mistake; he forgot *The Critique of Practical Reason*, where through Ethics Kant replaced the "Three Ideas" he had undercut in *The Critique of Pure Reason*. It is an illuminating fact that Kant, Sidgwick, Claudel—utterly unlike in temperament and circumstance—faced with the small word "ought," alike make Ethics, not Metaphysics, humanity's saving, explanatory clue.

Claudel, dealing with the supreme question, Who, what, for what are we? argues that if we will have an answer, we must use our whole self: reason, feeling, intuition, will; finally reminding Rivière that forms of proof, cogent in mathematics, in any "pure science," are inapplicable to the human sciences:

"Whatever I do, I can never make Catholic Truth self-evident, because God does not will that it should be, but demands from us an effort of generous and free will to seize hold of Him. *Vere Tu es Deus absconditus*."‡

\* R. and P. C., p. 108.

† Book I., chap. iii.

‡ R. and P. C., p. 109.



By December, Rivière confessed to "a light dawning within me: . . . oh! not yet a Christian light," but a "formless hope which grows,"\* adding, "Logic will never matter to me."

For the first time, too, he admits the reality, almost the validity, of intuition:

"If I am ever brought back, it will be by some inner power."†

In spite of intellectual pride, he had to learn, like some others, that the most real sight is neither of eyes nor intellect, but of the spirit. Not even his engagement and marriage, in 1908, to Isabelle Rivière checked his inner distress. In May, Claudel cuttingly rebuked him for arguing for argument's sake; more severely still, for seeming to disparage man's highest mental powers:

"Because our limited intelligence does not give us clear sight about everything, that is no ground for mistrusting it where it works legitimately. I have a horror of all waste and contempt for God's gifts. To say that intellect only serves for our entertainment is like saying that poetic imagination has no further use than the fabrication of Parnassian sonnets; or end-of-the-year book-reviews."‡

Rivière explained that he meant nothing of the sort, but immediately started so many philosophic hares that Claudel bluntly wrote that he saw no further use in correspondence:

"When I wrote to you, it was in a brotherly hope of helping you, not to embark on sterile, philosophic controversies, for which I have neither taste nor capacity."§

Yet, inexhaustibly patient, two months later he resumed:

"Do not heed my violent words. . . . It is no lack of love. I have such pity for young men who, like myself, started out in the tainted mists of University education."||

The turning-point of a long religious struggle often is not discernible: to few is vouchsafed a Damascus road. Rivière is an exception, a plain instance of the saying St. John records: "If any man wills to do His Will, he shall know of the doctrine." Rivière willed. He had thought, read, prayed: following Claudel's counsel, he had been present at Mass, "cet enfant insupportable," as he dubbed himself. On the intellectual side remained passion for fact: *les faits ne se laissent pas vaincre!* So he learned that our Lord's stupendous promise demands the whole activity of composite human nature. Reason without willing and doing cannot claim fulfilment. Suddenly, he perceived that reason, though essential, is insufficient: intuition,

\* R. and P. C., p. 112.

† *Ibid.*, p. 152.

§ *Ibid.*, p. 170.

† *Ibid.*, p. 120.

|| *Ibid.*, p. 178.



feeling, are "real" too. This he argues in the Notes for one of his Prison Discussions, *The Necessity and the Method of the Mystical Search*.<sup>\*</sup> Using "mystical" loosely, he remains alive to dangers; since supposition may be mistaken for intuition, he provides a test. Intuition is known by

"the absolutely direct, immediate nature of the perception, analogous to 'sensible' perception;"<sup>†</sup>

and again:

"When once one has entered into this condition of humility and general belief in Truth, one knows quite well, in a particular case, whether one is in it or not."<sup>‡</sup>

He knows, too, the urgent danger that "feeling" may degenerate into mere sentimentality. As we, so he has no remedy save vigilant good sense. But with his acute grasp on fact, he knows that "life" is dangerous, and that possible abuse is the feeblest motive for abstaining from use. He realizes, too, human differences: "Discovery is demanded from some; from others, just belief," the familiar story of the philosopher and the charcoal burner, of the shepherds in the adjoining field and the Sages who came "from far." Rivière had come so far, to escape that sere, bleak wilderness of rationalism, than which none can be more bitter, more stripped.

At the crisis of the struggle, Rivière's letters are missing. In May, Claudel sent him the address he desired, of M. l'Abbé Daniel Fontaine, Curé of Notre Dame Auxiliatrice at Clichy, adding:

"He is a plain and good man: extremely intelligent, overflowing with gentleness and love. . . . He is the priest who aided Huysmans in his last moments, and he always speaks with much feeling of that saint and sufferer."

The sequel is recorded in Claudel's Preface to *A La Trace de Dieu*:

"Providence led this soul of good will through its intellectual pilgrimage, through all the confusions of adolescence to that Christmas Day in 1913 when, by an act, in which a noble deliberation of judgment played a greater part than any emotional exigency, he went and knelt at the feet of this holy parish priest of Clichy."

Only those who have never penetrated beneath the hyper-æsthete to the eventual penitent will recoil from this juxtaposition of Huysmans and Rivière.

In eight months the Great War broke out, one month later Rivière was a prisoner, Alain Fournier among the "missing."

<sup>\*</sup> R. and P. C., pp. 154-160.

<sup>†</sup> *A La Trace de Dieu*, p. 158.

<sup>‡</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 158.



To the War's end Rivière and his family hoped vainly for his return.

In the fourth volume of their Letters, Isabelle Rivière published further extracts, beyond those in *A La Trace de Dieu*, from her husband's Prison notebooks, showing the young men's drifting apart. Rivière, absorbed in theological discussion with Claudel, failed to perceive it till too late, when, in the un-comforted pain of his prison, Henri was reported missing. Characteristically, he shouldered the entire blame:

"A terrible indictment against me, I failed. . . . I did not help him enough. I did not give him enough of this 'life' in me, with me, ever by my side, which he lacked. . . . O, how I failed in love to him . . . how pettily I refused to give myself. To his bitter demands, often made in an aggressive and clumsy fashion, how little I responded. . . . How more and more he must have felt his slight hold on me. And, on my side . . . what stinginess of myself . . . what ingratitude—in the primary sense—of my inmost heart when I was with him. . . . The sharpness he showed . . . all sprang from his needing me more than any other of my friends did. . . . I gave myself twenty times more to twenty others, nowhere near him in worth, infinitely less dear to me."\*

Poignancy of remorse, universal as ourselves, when it is too late to say we never meant a bit of it!

The sincerity of Rivière's return to the faith may be gauged by the quality of his reparation; he had learned what sacrifice means:

"I realized that though it was too late for anything else, I can at least ask God to lay on me the burden of Henri's defaults: to require expiation from me, not him; . . . to pardon him, enter on my account all the good I never did him, everything wherein I failed him. . . . Lay on me the load of all the faults I made him commit through my insufficiencies: on me let the obligation lie to expiate for him—on me to whom time remains."†

This Pilgrim of Eternity had travelled through pain long drawn out, from the "poisonous mists" of "philosophic doubt" to the Altar of Sacrifice.

Ten years on, for him, too, time remained no longer:

"Ten separating years, and then he who had been left behind, in the midst of his last agony's suffering, stretched out his arms with the joyful cry: 'Henri, I come!'"

So wrote Madame Rivière.

The Fournier correspondence shows his philosophic and literary development; the Claudel Letters record, with *A La Trace de Dieu*, the stages of his religious struggle; together, they provide evidence that the stiffest, most complex intellec-

\* Cor.: J. R. and A. F., vol. iv., pp. 380-383.

† Ibid., pp. 386-387.



tuality can still, as always, arrive at Christian Truth. A passage from *A La Trace de Dieu* shows that his "return" did not trammel his active inquiring mind:

"we must award some value to the small gains attainable, here and there, in this fight against the unknown. Because, these are the beginnings of true knowledge. Final knowledge is made up of an accumulation of them. Certitude cannot be carried by assault with a single stroke: it is refused to all those who have declined its earliest indications, to everyone who enters this battle with the watch-word 'All or nothing!' If we skip these beginnings, all values fade entirely: . . . if, contrariwise, we halt at Truth's first faint signs, if we 'see' them, then they grow and join. Perhaps, for long enough, each seems to remain isolated; in such hours, it is dark night. But, at long last, they strengthen, grow—so much indeed, that, without any forcing, contact is established among them, and then, like a flawless harmonious morning, Truth breaks!"\*

There is the old Rivière, analytic, accurate, precise as ever about what "really is."

Was he, as he told Claudel, as his wife admits, "intellectually proud"? She ought to know; "his pride whispered to him that in the daily path he ought not to be one of those who follow, but one of those whom others follow."†

Yet, there is a saying about the game and the onlookers. Was it, at any rate after boyhood, less pride than that consciousness of capacity which sometimes engenders an intolerable sense of responsibility? The sense of vocation, unless it is a vast mistake, is *vocation*; really means a call, and an ensuing duty. What but this, in prison, racked by ignorance of Henri's fate, unbearably irked by confinement, turned his mind to plan that treatise on Apologetics, for future seekers and disputants, and made him jot down this confident suggestion?

"You believe in Science because it takes account of so many of the facts. With much sounder reason you must believe in Religion, for it takes account of them all."‡

*Rassembleur* is his word. "To take account of" is not necessarily to solve, to explain everything; that outpasses the finite mind's power, when faced with Infinity. But it burks nothing; religion takes account of all that is "there." Claudel declared:

"what attracted him in the Catholic Faith is its homogeneity with reality: being made of the same kind of proofs, enigmas, suggestions and strangenesses; its fellow feeling for what actually appears.§

So this highly dowered, very "modern" youth proves, once more, that "return" is not to be expected only from the

\* *A La Trace de Dieu*, p. 162.

† *A La Trace de Dieu*, p. 255.

‡ Cor.: C. and J. R., p. xi.

§ *Ibid.*, p. 13.



emotional, however wholesome and sincere the emotion; but can be engendered in part by concern for *reality*, stiffened by the will, at all costs and risks, to seek it. That was Rivière's way. Once again, the Hound of Heaven won:

"All which thy child's mistake  
Fancies as lost, I have stored for thee at home:  
Rise, clasp My hand, and come!"

To keep the balance of this actual man poised, his strong likes and dislikes must be included. Claudel fancied he cared to be called a *savant*, yet he hit them hard:

"The savants' horrid laughter, their frigid unshakable certitude."\*

There is, too, his impertinent, yet so wholly pertinent gibe at *la race plate des optimistes* (the dead-level tribe of optimists). In a late letter to Henri, his pleasant social wit escapes:

"To-day, I spent an hour with Odilon Redon . . . it seems I had an extraordinary chance. He is like a lazy old tom-cat, with no taste for new acquaintances."†

Finally, the middle stages of the great struggle need to be balanced with the closing years, for his life is fact, not fiction, no "romance," but a piece of Life's jagged edges and irregular developments. Rivière is no stock hero, but a most human being, in whose "battle" there was indeed "no discharge."

The editorial years 1919-25 were a severe test. His always delicate health was undermined by prison hardship, he was indelibly marked by the unparalleled strain of the dreadful years 1914-18. Added to that came anxiety of providing for his family. His path was still so hard, beset with thwartings, that it is not surprising, as his wife admits, that some of his external Catholic practice ceased. She describes how the great Paris churches jarred him, "the incessant coming and going . . . intolerable shuffling of chairs and pence . . ." were "torture to him." "He could not find God in them. His scrupulous faith needed more silence, more recollection." After all, seeing there are small quiet churches in Paris, why should the overstrained attempt such trials? Though she does not say so, her words may suggest that he had a mystical strand. One prayer from the pocket-books supports this:

"My God, give me a mind quite emptied, very pure, entirely single, that I may welcome other men's ideas, and never try to replace them with my own, but only with those that You have told me for their good."

\* *A La Trace de Dieu*, p. 340.

† Cor.: J. R. and A. F., vol. iv., p. 87.



If he curtailed external practice, faith remained:

"never, on a single day, to life's end, did he fail in that evening prayer, when the Christian confesses his wretchedness, admits his dependence, and begs for succour."\*

To the end his faith held. His wife records that his "cry of triumph" after "the Holy Oil descended on his eyes" was, "Now, I am miraculously saved."

In life's daily ways secure peace, victory were not his. In small things as in great, he was constantly frustrated. He had not even the length of days sufficient to the production of his planned Apologetics, for which he seemed singularly fitted. Yet his life is sufficient "Apology." For those who can see, this real man, no creature of fiction, but a "feeling, thinking, acting man," of this hard-pressed generation, confronted with those secular problems which have met thoughtful youth in all civilized times and places, this man faced his tangle, fought his fight, snatched his victory:

"The man who though his fights be all defeats  
Still fights,  
Enters at last

The heavenly Jerusalem's rejoicing streets  
With glory more and more triumphant rites  
Than always conquering Joshua's . . .  
And, lo, the glad surprise  
of peace beyond surmise  
More than in common Saints, for ever in his eyes."

GERALDINE HODGSON.

\* R. and P. C., p. ix.



## MISCELLANEA

### NOTES AND COMMENTS

WE have received a copy of *The Scottish Liturgy in Greek*, which has been printed for the Episcopal Church in Scotland by the Cambridge University Press. It is introduced by a brief Foreword, also in Greek, from the Primus of the Scottish Episcopal Church, addressed to the Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople and to the other Patriarchs, archbishops, bishops, and clergy of the Orthodox Churches. We understand that the dedication of the translation, which is evidently the work of scholarly hands, has been greatly appreciated.

The Rev. T. B. Scrutton, Rector of Greenford, Middlesex, has published under the title of *Our God, Our Church, Ourselves* a series of Simple Instructions for Confirmation Candidates and others. Sound doctrine and popular apologetic seem to us well combined in these pages, and many clergy will find them helpful in preparing for their own classes.

### CORRESPONDENCE

#### THE WAY OUT FROM LITURGICAL CHAOS

DEAR SIR,

In his temperate article in the February issue of *THEOLOGY*, on the above subject, Mr. K. D. Mackenzie mentions that "the prohibition of the Elevation would effectually damp the enthusiasm of most of those who might, on other grounds, desire this rite." The rite in question is that of 1549. But he goes on with the soothing supposition that, were this rite authorized, prohibition of the Elevation would be unlikely. It is impossible not to wonder whether the rite of 1549 is not desired solely because, unlike 1928, it makes the Elevation ceremonies seem devotionally reasonable. In a word, the chaos which it is desired to abolish is not really a liturgical chaos, in the narrow sense of the word, but a ceremonial chaos. At all costs a rite must be discovered which will not interfere with the reasonableness of certain ceremonial customs which appear to have a sort of absolute authority with those who wish to preserve them. For such priests, ceremonial is not the handmaid of liturgy, expressing and interpreting the ritual; it is rather the controlling and determining factor to which the actual words must be subservient.

I believe that it is this attitude which is behind the apparent liturgical chaos. We are faced, not with any very vital differences on liturgical and ritual forms, but with a difference as to the value to be attached to a certain ceremonial ethos, the value of a certain devotional flavour in public worship. The discussion on points of actual ceremonial sometimes reveals this. Behind much of it there lies, in certain quarters, a deep desire to safeguard and preserve a certain number of ceremonies which will give to such ritual forms as are used the ethos and flavour of Roman



Catholic devotion. Not that this desire is often expressed. But the existence of such a desire alone is adequate to account for the advocacy of certain rites and ceremonies and the rejection of others. It is this unexpressed wish which appears to form the basic principle of judgment in liturgical matters in the minds of a number of priests. I do not at all wish to say here that the desire to make our public worship taste Roman is utterly wrong or wicked. But I believe that the conscious recognition of this unspoken wish would make liturgical discussion easier and more real. At present it seems that while we appear to be discussing one thing, the real issue lies hid somewhere else. Thus you cannot profitably discuss what rite is, on general grounds, best, while your interlocutor is really wondering what rite will best enable the continuation of certain ceremonies designed to create a certain atmosphere.

This letter is not meant to be quarrelsome. The method of presenting public worship and the right devotional atmosphere to be aimed at is plainly a matter on which more light is needed. It is in the hope that the ritual and the ceremonial questions may be kept apart and discussed apart that it is written.

Yours very truly,

COLIN DUNLOP.

BAGHDAD,

February 12, 1933.

[We think that Mr. Dunlop's letter is effective as against the particular point urged by Mr. Mackenzie. But we believe that Mr. Mackenzie's difficulty could be expressed much more broadly, and in terms which would represent the mind of large numbers of people who are indifferent to Elevation or even dislike it. The point is not whether the 1928 Canon with its conservatory *epiclesis* would involve a breach with Roman ceremonial, but whether it would not involve too great a breach with post-Reformation Anglican usage. This was the point which Dr. Armitage Robinson used to present with such force in the Convocation debates on Prayer Book revision; and it is a serious one. Church-people of all schools of thought have been accustomed to regard our Lord's own words of institution as the climax of the Prayer of Consecration; and the adjustment to a longer Canon which contains a second climax is not a very simple matter. Ed.]



## REVIEWS

### THE PILGRIMAGE OF FAITH IN THE WORLD OF MODERN THOUGHT.

The Stephanos Nirmalendu Ghosh Lectures for 1927-28.

By Douglas Clyde Macintosh, Professor of Theology, Yale University. Calcutta: The University Press; London: Longmans, Green and Co. 1931. 7s. 6d.

RELIGIOUS REALISM. Edited by D. C. Macintosh. Pp. viii. + 502. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1931.

Lectures by a Canadian professor in an American University to his fellow-subjects in India might well be expected to produce an interesting volume; and they have done so in the book before us. Professor Macintosh took for his theme the quest of faith for a universal religion, and most of his lectures were occupied with presenting to his Oriental hearers a survey of the development of Western philosophical thought. Drawing a parallel with the story of the Old Testament, he pictured religious thought as emerging from the Egyptian bondage of traditionalism, as passing through the wilderness of empiricism and critical agnosticism into the promised land of rational idealism, and thence through the captivity of pragmatism to the restored temple of critical monism and scientific theology—his own position.

Dr. Macintosh stood before his audience as an avowed Christian, speaking with a sympathetic understanding of their different backgrounds, and seeking to draw out and commend to them the contribution which Christianity has to make to the gathering of mankind to be fellow-worshippers in a common faith. I may as well confess at once that I do not believe him to have laid secure foundations for any such future development. Honest and sincere as he is in his profession of Christian belief, the Christianity which he professes seems to me to be something different from the faith in which lies the hope of all mankind.

His position was made clear in his previous book, *The Reasonableness of Christianity*, and there is no essential change of view between the earlier and the later work. His starting-point is the conviction that the normal or standard outlook of a healthy man is a "moral optimism," which confidently expects the fulfilment of all the possibilities of perfection latent in human nature and in creation generally. Whatever may be logically deduced as a requirement of this moral optimism may be taken to be true of the universe at large, and one of these requirements is that the ultimate Power behind all things may



be depended upon to "back up" those who act as moral optimists. To identify the God of inner personal communion with this Power behind the universe is the essential act of Christian Theism, and resolutely to live by this faith is the practice of the Christian religion, and its truth is verified by the practical success which attends upon the venture of faith. The part played by Jesus Christ is that he opened to us the vision of this true way of life by his own perfect living of it. A few quotations from the present work will help to expound his thesis.

"Truth is representation of subject-matter by predicate, of reality by idea, as intellectualists have always insisted; but the test as to whether this representation of reality by idea is such as to merit the epithet 'true' is found in the practical test of acting upon the idea, being guided by it, in adjusting oneself to the reality in question" (p. 183).

"A unifying concept is called for, to bring together these cosmic aspects and the spiritual phases of Deity; and the one which seems to be most obviously suggested by the facts is that of a psycho-physical organism, animated by an indwelling spiritual mind and will. This analogy of the organism is inadequate, to be sure, but it is undoubtedly preferable to the anti-moral idealistic notion of one eternally static, all-inclusive pool of conscious experience. The physical universe is God's holy, awe-inspiring body; its energy is God's physical energy, organically related to a central 'Loving Intelligent Will.' . . . The analogy may be carried somewhat further. The human mind and will are sometimes more fully immanent in the activities of the body than at other times. . . . Similarly, in response to prayer as the right religious adjustment—and no doubt also often, or always, of the "divine initiative"—the immanent Divine Spirit enters more fully into the lives of men. From this point of view human individuals in their relation to the Divine Body and Spirit may be regarded as psycho-physical organs—or better, perhaps, as cells—within the one great cosmic psycho-physical organism. The analogy holds at many points. Man, by taking thought, can modify not only his bodily behaviour, but in time even the structure of his body. Similarly the immanent Divine life can influence conduct and modify character. . . .

"We have identified the cosmic God of moral optimism with the God of scientific theology, and in doing so we have found a synthesis of the transcendence and the immanence of God, a union of the 'Beyond' with the 'Within.' Thus, we may believe, justice is done to the Semitic 'numinous' sense of awe-inspiring holiness and majesty of God—'high and lifted up,' as Isaiah expresses it—and the Indian mystical sense of union with the Divine in the inmost depths of the spirit. . . . [But] while it is no doubt true that as Sankara said, 'there can be no object that can remain separated from the underlying Brahma,' we are led to make a distinction between degrees of the immanence of God, varying according to the degree of the spiritual quality manifested. This doctrine of varying degrees of the divine immanence is the only immanence that is wholly acceptable to the Christian moral and religious consciousness, and it is anticipated in part, though only in part, in the traditional doctrine of the Holy Spirit" (pp. 259-262).



"The historical method in the form in which it is generally recognized among Christians is the Christocentric method, that is, the method which finds its normative revelation of the Divine in the spirit and ideals of the historic Jesus, as these are interpreted in the light not only of the most reliable traditions, but of the Christian religious experience at its best" (p. 272).

"... The historic Jesus, viewed as the concrete embodiment of moral faith, moral hope, and moral love, and religiously appreciated as a normative revelation of the immanence of the Divine" (p. 274).

"It may be, of course, that there is some room for difference of opinion as to the extent to which the Jesus of history actually realized the moral and religious ideal and exemplified the immanence of God in human life; but no such possible theoretical doubt need greatly disturb us. The fundamental elements of universal religion remain unchanged in any case. They are logically valid; the uncertainty, if it exists, is with reference to the historical roots of certain ideas that have proved effective psychologically in impressing upon the human imagination and heart that which can be shown to be valid in any case and without them" (p. 281).

If we take first the question of historical method, it seems to me that Dr. Macintosh is inaccurate in stating that his so-called "Christocentric method" is that which is "generally recognized among Christians." What most Christians believe, surely, is not that the *method* is Christocentric, but that history itself is. They do not ask for the privilege of being allowed to use any peculiar "historical method." They claim that the honest study of history according to its own methods and canons (which should not be different for different points of view) shows Jesus Christ to hold a central place in the cosmic drama of creation. They believe, for example, that any securely grounded "moral optimism" such as Dr. Macintosh requires to be the natural and normal human outlook, is itself an outcome of the Incarnation, remembering such historical facts as are described by Dr. Edwyn Bevan in his essay on *The First Contact of Christianity and Paganism*,\* and such historical judgments as that of Professor Whitehead when he writes: "I am not arguing that the European trust in the scrutability of nature was logically justified even by its own theology. My only point is to understand how it arose. My explanation is that the faith in the possibility of science, generated antecedently to the development of modern scientific theory, is an unconscious derivative from medieval theology."†

Dr. Macintosh delivered his lectures in the session 1927-28. At that time it was easy for anyone in America to take optimism as a law of nature from which one could argue to nature's God. There were many, indeed, who found nature so satisfactory that they had no need of any further God: "God," they said, "is

\* In *Hellenism and Christianity* (London, 1921).

† *Science and the Modern World* (New York, 1925), p. 18.



the personification of the spirit of social progress." It is possible that the collapse of the New York Stock Exchange in October, 1929, sounded the death-knell of this way of thinking, but in its day it exercised a powerful influence, and forms part of the background of the collection of essays called *Religious Realism*. "Religious Realism, as the term is used in this volume (says the Preface) means centrally the view that a religious Object, such as may appropriately be called God, exists independently of our consciousness thereof," and the book helps to explain the genesis of the kind of theology just mentioned. The fifteen authors, all men of eminence in different American universities, are united in being unconvinced by those arguments which represent religious belief in God as the illusory objectifying of an imaginary divine companion, the product of an unconscious "escape mechanism" at work in weaklings unable to face the world as it is. They claim that the "natural" optimism of the "go-getter" implies a view of the universe which justifies our speaking of "God," for his activities imply that the universe can be trusted to reward his endeavours. "God" may thus be regarded as a logical deduction from the principles of action of the normal man, and is not merely a psychological construction of the abnormal. For God (in the phrase of Professor Wieman) "is the structure of supreme value viewed as possibility of existence, and also that kind of process in nature which most nearly approximates this order of supreme value and promotes further approximation to it. Thus God is both the most beneficent actuality and the supreme ideal" (p. 175).

The widespread influence of this way of thinking made American religion ripe for the Barthian reaction. Professor Helmut Niebuhr presages the coming challenge:

"A further criticism which may be made of American theological realism from the point of view of modern German philosophy of religion is that our realism is still too much under the influence of a progressive and technological era which is interested in knowledge for the sake of power and which, in religion, is prone to define God in terms of his utilizable relations to the neglect of his uniquely divine or holy character. Hence it tends to define religion in terms of adjustment to divine reality for the sake of gaining power rather than in terms of revelation which subjects the recipient to the criticism of that which is revealed . . . German theology is highly critical of the apparent lack of concern in our theology about Christian doctrine in general and Protestant doctrine in particular. . . . As the Barthian theology would put it, our American religious realism fails to note the distinction between religion, as the universal human activity directed towards God, and Christianity, which is not a religion, but God's revelation of himself—the vertical entrance of the absolute into time" (pp. 425-7).



It is one thing to interpret the universe in the light of Jesus Christ accepted as God incarnate, the central fact in history. It is quite another to construct on independent grounds a universal religion, and to use Jesus Christ as a possibly dispensable historical illustration of it. Such a religion is inevitably infected with the impermanence of the philosophical system that produces it; Christianity's hope of an enduring universality lies in its being the proclamation of what God has done, not itself a philosophical system, but material to be worked into all future systems. Both the *Pilgrimage of Faith* and *Religious Realism* are interesting and valuable volumes as able expositions of contemporary currents of thought in American philosophy of religion, but in so far as they disregard the historical element in the faith they profess, their authors cut themselves off from the only type of religion which can expect to become universal.

LEONARD HODGSON.

## NOTICES

ALBERT SCHWEITZER: MY LIFE AND THOUGHT. An Autobiography. Translated by C. T. Champion. George Allen and Unwin. 10s. 6d. net.

There is something inspiring and romantic about the brilliant Alsatian scholar who, at the height of his fame as a theologian and a musician, was prepared without any hesitation, for love of suffering humanity, to devote toilsome years to the study of medicine in order to found and maintain a hospital in the heart of Africa, from which he emerges at intervals to raise money to carry on this noble work. Albert Schweitzer has given us the story of his wonderful career, and we are grateful for it.

It is nearly twenty-six years ago since Dr. Sanday introduced to English theological circles the "young *Privatdozent* at Strassburg." "From first to last," Sanday wrote, "he holds a single clue firmly in his hand," viz., the prominence he gave to the apocalyptic features of the Gospels. Schweitzer's outlook in this respect throughout the years has remained unchanged. The picture that he is still prepared to draw of a fallible Teacher who lived in the fantastic thought-world of the late Jewish expectation of the speedy appearance of a supernatural Messianic Kingdom seems hard to reconcile with the evidence of the Gospels, and also with Schweitzer's belief in our Lord as the inspirer of our actions and the guide of our life. "Christian piety of any and every sort is valuable only so far as it means the surrender of our will to His." This is indeed finely said. What, we not unreasonably ask, is the relation of this fallible apocalyptic Christ to the Christ of Christian experience?

This apocalyptic clue Schweitzer still holds in his hand when he proceeds to interpret the theology of St. Paul. Of this we will not speak as we have not yet seen his recent book *The Mysticism of Paul the Apostle*. One remark must suffice: Is it true to say that "the mystical habit of thought is something unknown to Judaism"? Dr. J. Abelson wrote his little



book *Jewish Mysticism*, and also the larger work *The Immanence of God in Rabbinical Literature*, to prove the contrary. And we may perhaps quote in this connection Deut. xxx. 14, "The word is very nigh unto thee, in thy mouth, and in thy heart"; and Philo, "Let every one on whom the Love of God has showered good things pray to God that he may have as a dweller within him the Ruler of all things." St. Paul's mysticism of being in Christ and Christ dwelling in us is not far from such teaching and is parallel to St. John xv.

There is much in this book that is charming and helpful; we shall be the better for reading this amazing record of ceaseless work, of the writer's devotion to suffering humanity in "the Fellowship of those who bear the mark of Pain" (a beautiful thought, developed in Schweitzer's *On the Edge of the Primæval Forest*), above all of his Reverence for Life. "The ethic of Reverence for Life is the ethic of Love widened unto universality"; it includes, too, the animal creation in a way from which no living man can escape. Schweitzer is Franciscan in the greatness of his loving heart. He is Franciscan also in his abandonment of self. His life has been one of continual sacrifice, and now for the years that remain he looks with calmness and humility "so that I may not be unprepared for renunciation if it be required of me."

R. D. MIDDLETON.

L'ORTHODOXIE. By Archiprêtre Serge Bulgakov. Paris: Libraire Felix Alcan. 15 francs.

This is the most profound book on the religion of the Orthodox Church by one of her members that I have yet seen. It does not deal with the external side of the Church, the different national churches, etc., but with her internal life. The most important as well as the longest chapters explain the Orthodox view of tradition and of the hierarchy: and the author then proceeds to discuss the unity and the holiness of the Church, dogma, sacraments, and worship, her attitude towards the State, toward ethics, economics, and eschatology, and towards other Christian confessions. The one thing which we miss is her attitude towards the non-Christian world: there is no chapter on Missions, which is strange in view of the great history of the missions of the Russian Church.

The book opens with these words, which strike a note for all that follows: "Orthodoxy is the Church of Christ on earth, The Church of Christ is not an institution: it is a new life with Christ and in Christ, directed by the Holy Ghost. The light of the resurrection of Christ shines on the Church, and the joy of the resurrection, of triumph over death, fills it."

Our hearts echo at once to these words: and we are not surprised to find that nearly all that Father Bulgakov says of Scripture and tradition, and of the relation of the hierarchy to the Church, is what we say ourselves. Scripture and tradition cannot be separated, yet Scripture has a unique primacy. The function peculiar to the clergy is strictly sacramental, and the whole Church, not the clergy only, is responsible for doctrine: the distinction between "ecclesia docens" and "ecclesia discens" is firmly repudiated: much importance is attached to the prophetic gift. Great emphasis is laid on the conception of *Sobornost*, which is translated by "conciliarité." This was called by Khomiakov "the soul of Orthodoxy": it is qualitative, as opposed to quantitative, Catholicity: the word *Sobornaia* is used to translate "Catholic" in the Nicene Creed. Thus it is the whole Church to which infallibility is ascribed, not any council



of representatives: but the decisions of the whole Church are not obtained by a plebiscite, but by life. Clearly infallibility means to the Orthodox something quite different from what it meant either to Dr. Pusey or to Dr. Salmon. The idea of an *organ* of infallibility is rejected on principle. On the other hand, not only the Seven Councils but also certain local councils (e.g., the Council of Carthage) are received by the Church as having made infallible decisions.

Father Bulgakov appears to accept the modern critical methods to Scripture, if undertaken by believers. On p. 118 he says that "Liberty is the nerve of theological thought." The common notion that Orthodox theology became petrified after the Iconoclastic controversy is a mistake due to want of knowledge: it has continued to develop in various directions to the present day, and Russian theology in particular, applied to modern problems by the thinkers of the emigration, may have a great future before it.

The Orthodox emphasis on the doctrine of the Trinity in worship, familiar to all who have attended Orthodox services, is the consequence of living experience (p. 144). The doctrine of the Trinity is not for the Orthodox, as it is too often for Western Christians, a bare dogma. This is probably one of the reasons why their worship is so attractive. Father Bulgakov seems to think that the liturgical method of reaching the heart of Orthodoxy is difficult for Western man. That is not the experience of those of us who have found in the Orthodox liturgy what we have not experienced anywhere else.

Where we cannot quite follow Father Bulgakov, we are hindered by the history of our own Church, so different from that of the Orthodox, and by our modern critical education. We cannot, of course, agree that the Orthodox Church is the whole Church, even with the qualification that other parts of Christendom are more or less Orthodox: but we claim that our separation from the Orthodox Church was not our fault, and that we have for generations been slowly finding our way back. We do not recognize as our own the so-called branch theory, rejected by the author, that the one Church realizes itself differently but equally in Orthodoxy, Romanism, and Anglicanism" (p. 123). It is impossible for us to treat our tradition, which has been more than once broken, as the Orthodox do theirs, which is unbroken: nor can we simply adopt theirs, which would be to break with our own history. Hence some of what Father Bulgakov says, both about the Mother of God and about the icons, presents great difficulty to most Anglicans (pp. 166, 196, 259).

The few references to Anglicanism as such are most optimistic: "One may hope that the reunion of Orthodoxy with the Anglo-American Episcopal Churches will be the work of a sufficiently near future, and that this moment will be decisive in the history of the re-establishment of the lost unity of the Church and of peace between the East and the West" (p. 267). Nevertheless the author does not quite realize the difference in principle between the Continental and the English Reformations, between the appeal to individual experience and the appeal to the Undivided Church, which makes the Anglican Communion "*tertium quid*," neither Latin nor in the Continental sense Protestant.

The book ends with the suggestion that the Holy Ghost is leading the nations to unity, which can only be found in Orthodoxy. "The nations are now searching for Orthodoxy, often without knowing it: the nations will find it, for it is said, 'Seek, and ye shall find'" (p. 269).



This very important book ought to be speedily translated and widely read. The translator should observe that the author usually (not always) uses 'catholique' to mean Roman Catholic, as opposed to Orthodox, and should translate it in accordance with the context. On p. 43 the author attributes the saying "In necessariis unitas," etc., to St. Augustine, but I am told that it cannot be found in his works or in any ancient author. On p. 54 he calls the Didache a document of the first century: some scholars, such as Dr. Armitage Robinson, put it considerably later.

C. B. Moss.

SCOTTISH ABBEYS AND SOCIAL LIFE. By G. G. Coulton, Litt.D. (Camb.).  
Cambridge University Press. 12s. 6d.

In this attractive volume Dr. Coulton tells us that his method is to construct by way of criticism. Whether that is the best way to write history is a matter of opinion. But it is Dr. Coulton's way. The average reader will probably wish that the author had criticized less and constructed more. For the benefit of this class of reader, however, he has "blocked in," as he puts it, a general statement to the effect that he regards the monasteries as one of the greatest and most beneficent forces in the social life of the Middle Ages. In subsequent chapters he recurs to this central judgment, so that only a very careless reader could accuse the author of offering a narrow and partial criticism of monastic influence in Scotland. On the other hand, the student, as distinguished from the general reader, will find no difficulty, under Dr. Coulton's guidance, in constructing a fairly clear picture of the revenues and endowments of religious houses, and of the relation of Scottish abbeys to parishes and peasants, to writing, learning, education, art and business. Numerous extracts are given from contemporary documents, so that even the general reader is able to judge for himself, and is free to differ, as we have done in several cases, from Dr. Coulton's interpretation of the sources. In the last three chapters of the twenty contained in the book strong evidence is adduced from visitation records and from Richardson's *Commentary on the Rule of St. Augustine* to show that corruptions were at work threatening the very existence of religious houses in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. Scottish abbeys would appear to have been worse than English, for while there is no case of the official recognition of a common informer in England, there are from Ireland and Scotland 370 such cases in forty-four years. Not that nationality counts for much in monastic life: the various religious orders transcended nationality. That is not to say that little interest attaches to the religious houses of Scotland. On the contrary, what is set down here about Holyrood, Kelso, Melrose and other Scottish abbeys is deeply interesting. Dr. Coulton can make mediæval life more interesting than any other living historian. We only wish he would be a little less pugnacious and also less disposed to pass from the sixteenth century to Queen Margaret at a stride. The work is finely printed and contains some good illustrations; it is equipped with a very full index.

W. PERRY.



**PASTORAL LECTURES OF BISHOP EDWARD KING.** Edited by Eric Graham. A. R. Mowbray and Co. 1s. 6d.

Even the brief notes of lectures and addresses written down by such a man are precious. Almost every page of this little book reveals the Bishop's saintly and practical wisdom, and provides correction for the experienced priest as well as guidance for the ordinand. As to visiting, for example, he says, "The worse the weather, go the more." When ministering to the sick, "shut the door gently . . . don't weary them . . . speak softly . . . leave one verse as an antiphon to ring on in their ears when you are gone." At to preaching, "If they think you are a party man they are on their guard. . . . Don't lay on earnestness . . . don't lower the dignity of the pulpit." And so on. It is a book to slip into the pocket for use at odd moments; and it will serve usefully on the prayer-desk as an aid to self-examination.

O. HARDMAN.

**DISCIPLESHIP AND CHRISTIAN WORSHIP.** A Study in the Mission of Christ and His Church. By Edward C. Rich. A. R. Mowbray and Co. 5s.

The chief Diocesan Inspector of Schools in the Diocese of London has sought to commend the truth that to be a Christian is to be a Catholic and to show that the manifold activity of the Christian life is gathered up in Eucharistic worship. It is a well-written appeal to "those of the educated classes who sit loosely to denominational loyalties," and is worth their careful attention. The only weak paragraph, from one reader's point of view, is that which begins on p. 134. A Eucharist without communicants other than the priest is not according to the mind of our Church; and it would have been better to endorse the wisdom of Bishop Gore and to commend the practice of those who are acting on that wisdom than to give a rather half-hearted approval to the mistake of seeking to isolate the sacrificial aspect of the Sacrament of the Altar.

O. HARDMAN.

**A STUDY IN CREATIVE HISTORY.** The Interaction of the Eastern and Western Peoples to 500 B.C. By O. E. Burton. George Allen and Unwin, Ltd. 10s. 6d.

The sub-title reproduces the heading of the final chapter of the book, and must surely have been added by someone who thought it necessary to explain the rather cryptic title but did not trouble to read the book; for, as the author himself says on p. 312 f.: "The period before 500 B.C. is predominantly one of preparation in comparative isolation. The fundamental ideas in religion and philosophy had been formulated and had developed into considerable systems. In very few cases, however, had there been any interaction" (cf. p. 300).

The book itself is an excellent study of the main movements of religious thought in the East and Near East in the course of that creative period which ends in about 500 B.C. The religious teaching of Israel, Persia, India and China, and some others, is dealt with in turn, and in every case the writer keeps close to the sacred books of the people whose contribution he is considering. It would be interesting, however, to know his estimate of the Christian system of thought; the suggestion made by



his choice of 500 B.C. as a term is, apparently, that all that follows may be explained as the result of the clashing, combining, and reshuffling of the fundamental ideas which had already been created.

O. HARDMAN.

OUTLINES OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. By M. Hiriyanna. George Allen and Unwin, Ltd. 15s.

This admirable textbook will serve, as its author intends, for the use of college students of Indian philosophy and also for general readers who are interested in Indian thought and religion. It is the ripe product of many years of lecturing in Mysore University; it is well-proportioned and clearly arranged; and it is written in a style entirely worthy of the dignity of its subject. As an introduction to venerable systems of thought which have a claim on all serious students of the philosophy of religion it is a very satisfactory piece of work.

O. HARDMAN.

THE APOSTLE OF THE INDIES. A life of St. Francis Xavier. By C. J. STRANKS, M.A. S.P.C.K. 5s.

Fülöp-Miller describes St. Francis Xavier as "the most gifted and successful missionary ever produced by the Catholic Church." If an exception be made in favour of St. Paul this judgment may well be endorsed; for in Xavier practical efficiency, human sympathy, adventurous courage, and utter selflessness combine to form a figure unique in the annals of Christian missionary enterprise. The achievements of the explorer and the pioneer always make fascinating reading; but the characters of those with whom Englishmen are most familiar are not normally distinguished by heroic sanctity. This book presents us with the story of a man who, even had he not been, in the author's phrase, "a man God-possessed," would have provided by his intense activity the most attractive material for his biographers. It is hoped that this book may be read by many of those English Churchmen who declare themselves "bored by the subject of Foreign Missions," or who regard the Mission Field merely as a source of tiresome financial appeals. For such an attitude of mind the most potent cure is such a biography as this, which emphasizes the missionary's heroism rather than his success, his love of souls rather than his civilizing influence.

The author wisely confines himself to an account of the practical work and pastoral power of Xavier, refusing to embellish his narrative with improbable and childish legends of miracles attributed to the Saint. The book suggests an answer to the problem that is frequently raised in Anglican circles today, namely, What special characteristic distinguishes the saint from his fellow-Christians? Xavier's life shows that his saintliness lay not in miraculous power or practical achievement, but rather in the fact that "from the day he took his vows to the moment he breathed his last, he was God's, all God's and God's alone."

HUMPHRY BEEVOR.



THE HEART OF CHRIST'S RELIGION. By the Rev. Canon E. E. Raven.  
Longmans, Green and Co. 6s.

This is a work of breadth and independence, well calculated to meet its aim of commending the essential religion of the Church to young and modern minds. It thoroughly justifies a proposed title which had to be discarded—*The Gospel of Love*—for it never swerves from the presentation of the love of God, and love in man, as the heart of Christ's religion. In this the writer is as persistent as Bishop Ken in his *Exposition of the Church Catechism*, of which it is almost a modern rendering.

Canon Raven divides his work into four sections: the first shows the divine purpose of love in creation and evolution; the second deals with the effect of love in the integration of human character; the third shows the Church (in spite of her many failures) as in organization, prayer, and sacrament the expression of and sphere for the exercise of love; and the last, treating of Theology, expounds the great Church doctrines on the basis of the activity of love alone. The writer writes "neither as a theologian nor a scientist nor an expert in any branch of learning, but simply as an ordinary parson who, in the course of a considerable experience of the difficulties of young people, has gradually come to realize something at least of the reason for those difficulties and the way in which they may find a solution." He follows the right path without technicalities; it is true of him that *pectus facit theologum*; he can be understood by any intelligent person unacquainted with scholastic jargon.

The education of a long period of Club-work at Hoxton is evident throughout, both in the directness of his arguments and in the illustrations, vivid and natural, of crude human nature and its development in the Boys' Club, which it was his happy lot to run.

It is to be hoped that the book will find a large public among younger people, to whom the Church does not seem to stand for anything interesting.

W. J. FERRAR.

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### BOOK NOTES

*An Introduction to Worship.* By R. L. Barnes. Mowbray. 1s.  
"Written for those in the family of Toc H who love the Church of England," by a Mirfield Father. It has just that sure dogmatic foundation, and belief in Catholic ways of worship and discipline, which all consciously modern religious movements need—even the best of them, like Toc H.

*Credo: A Tract for New Times on "The Christian Year."* By Desmond Morse-Boycott. Skeffington. 3s. 6d. Readings for the Sundays and chief holy days of a type which could worthily find a place in high-class Sunday papers or weekly reviews, did such papers admit religious and devotional Anglo-Catholic articles. The writer would not claim more for them than that they are journalism, but they are first-rate journalism by one who knows as well almost as any priest how it is done. But the comparison with John Keble—"I have tried to do in prose what he did in verse"—is not very apt. Such at least is the first impression. But perhaps Mr. Morse-Boycott knows best; perhaps the awed solemnity of John Keble as he deals with religious topics must necessarily be eschewed by a writer who wants to influence our age.



*The Cambridge Bible: St. Matthew.* By B. T. D. Smith. Cambridge University Press. 5s. A good up-to-date commentary on moderate critical lines.

*The Healing of Christ's Wounds.* By A. W. Stote. Skeffington. 2s. 6d. These addresses for the Three Hours' Service are commended by the Bishop of Salisbury; they will be found very useful by those who wish so to use the Devotion as to drive home the duty of supporting missionary work.

*The Man who Built the Great Pyramid.* By E. S. G. Bristowe. Williams and Norgate. 6s. Shem is "proved" to have built the Pyramid, and to be identical with Melchisedek. His religious writings were hidden away in the royal archives until the thirteenth century B.C. This curious book is sufficiently illustrated by a quotation from p. 139: "It seems possible that the Hyksos statue now in the Cairo Museum representing two priests standing behind an altar portrays the brothers Shem and Japhet, for although the features have been chipped away until the faces look scarcely human, the similarity of the two figures suggests a close relationship, and the one undamaged brow is of a nobly intellectual type."

*The Christian in his Blindness.* By W. H. Elliott. Longmans. 2s. 6d. A charmingly written book about religion, by a priest whose voice is known to very many from broadcast services. The only criticism that can fairly be passed on this and similar books is that they are advertised as "Lent Books"; the faithful ought in Lent to tackle something that makes far greater demands on their mental and spiritual resources.

*The Necessity for Catholic Reunion.* By T. Whitton. Williams and Norgate. 5s. The divisions within Anglo-Catholicism are curiously illustrated by this book. The writer holds that "Anglicanism has not been condemned by any infallible pronouncement of the Pope." But he takes the Roman view of the questions at issue between Rome and Canterbury. The Anglo-Catholic "Congress Books" abound in heresies. *One God and Father of All*, by Fathers W. Knox and Milner-White, is termed "that disgraceful production." Most of our readers who want to know the case against Anglicanism will prefer Roman Catholic books.

*To Lighten the Gentiles.* By T. W. Crafer. S.P.G. 1s. The fifth of the S.P.G. Lent Books.

*Good Manners in Church and Out.* By L. V. G. F. Lean. C. L. A. 1s. A manual of instruction in Churchmanship, covering a much wider ground than the title would lead one to expect. It is legalistic in tone, but probably we could do with a great deal more legalism, to stiffen up lax Anglican ways.

*Lead, kindly Light.* By Desmond Morse-Boycott. Centenary Press. 5s. Father Morse-Boycott exactly describes his book as "Studies of the Saints and Heroes of the Oxford Movement." It is a contribution to hagiography. Lytton Strachey and his imitators have lived in vain so far as this book is concerned. Is not this just what we want, to be stirred to affection and emulation? It is all done so deftly and gracefully, with such intimate touches and just the right admixture of the author's personality, that one can only capitulate and banish all idea of criticism.



*The Anglican Revival.* By Y. Brilioth. Longmans. 5s. The publishers deserve warm thanks for their enterprise in bringing out so cheap an edition of this valuable book, which was noticed by us at the time of its first publication in 1925.

W. K. L. C.

*Timeless Perfection: Man's Greatest Adventure.* By F. W. Kingston, B.D. Heffer. 3s. 6d. It had been simpler if this had been written either as a morality play or a treatise on Intuition. As a mixture of the two, with neither list of characters nor stage directions, it becomes "curst hard reading." When "Boy (*Spirit*)" appears we do not know whether he stands for the first self-conscious man or the race, or, in either case, at what stage he is told by Mind to read *Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde*. The theme appears to be that "all knowledge of every kind that comes to me is intuitive." But the knowledge of God is apparently originally revealed by the devil, who is acknowledged by Mind, Matter and Life as Master, and with them aims at confining Boy to space-time. That a series of theological disquisitions are advanced by a speaker labelled Intuition does not prove that they are perceived by Intuition and not by Mind. Finally (p. 106), Boy, who was already (p. 23) one personality with Mind, Life and Matter, is married to Life by Love—not at a registry office as Old Iniquity would prefer—and Genesis iii., slightly amended, is their honeymoon. It is a little confusing.

M. D. R. W.

*The Faiths of Mankind.* By William Paton, S.C.M. 2s. 6d. This is a useful introduction for the beginner to Comparative Religion, and not least for one who is beginning seriously to study Christianity. The great points of interest—Man and the World; God; Sin, Suffering and Salvation; the Good Life; the World to Come—are considered as viewed in the great religions, Hinduism, Buddhism, Islam and Christianity. Then follow brief studies of Muhammad, Buddha and Christ. Mr. Paton makes no pretence of so-called "impartiality." For him "those who give themselves in faith and love to Jesus do in very truth meet with the Eternal God," and Missions are "the sharing of good news about God."

M. D. R. W.

*Let us say Grace.* By Alick Bouquet. S.P.C.K. 2s. A small book, but a very interesting one. It deals with the history, the manner, and the duty of saying grace. As an anthology of forms of grace it would alone be valuable, but there is much besides. The history is traced, with examples, from Ancient Greece and Rome, through the Bible, and down the centuries. Then follows a shorter chapter on various customs that are, or have been, or should be connected with saying grace. Lastly comes "The Duty of Thankfulness," a short and admirable exposition of a plea for that duty.

V. I. R

*In the Footsteps of a Saint, and other sketches from Spain.* By Helen Colville. Burns Oates and Washbourne, Ltd. 5s. Half the book is entitled "In St. Teresa's Spain," and is the record of visits paid to nine Carmelite convents to collect information for a Life of the saint. It really does not add much to one's knowledge, and is marred by an ill-informed sentimentality. The author is not a Catholic, but even so it is astounding



that with her degree of education and experience she should so repeatedly misunderstand the saint and her followers. The judgments are almost incredibly superficial and cheap. There follow five little Stories of Spain, which display the same characteristics. The whole product is best described as journalese, and that not of the forgivable type.

V. I. R.

*Problems of Today.* By B. J. Bouchier. Skeffington. 6s. The Rector of St. Anne's, Soho, who has "formulated in his progress through life certain opinions," here presents them in his accustomed breezy style. He is concerned with the faults of the Church, and of society, which we are all concerned with. Among his specifics are Disestablishment, the "scraping of the Prayer Book in its entirety," and more flogging. It is permissible to question whether the renewal of religion lies along the lines he lays down. But the book may well be used as a basis for discussion, for, as Mr. Bouchier well says, "the ignorance of the ordinary person is colossal."

W. J. F.

*An Introduction to Schleiermacher.* By J. Arundel Chapman. The Epworth Press. 4s. It is inevitable that men bitten by Barth and Brunner should have to re-examine Schleiermacher, for if he is right the School of Crisis is wrong. "One cannot speak of God simply by speaking of man in a loud voice," said Barth, ruling Schleiermacher out of the succession that ran back from Luther and Calvin to St. Paul.

Mr. Chapman, who has already written on Barth, here writes of Schleiermacher, though he limits himself to the early *Reden*, not unsympathetically, but he concludes: "We needed the warning of the School of Crisis that there is no way from man to God; the only way is from God to man."

This is a very readable study, and helpful in distinguishing the two great schools of modern theology.

W. J. F.

*Sorrow, Sin and Suffering.* By T. F. Royds, B.D. Skeffington. 3s. 6d. This book is one of the new "Modernist Series." Mr. Royds' Modernism is sane, persuasive and reverent; he has assimilated the teaching of Tennant and Rashdall, and evidently himself thought out its implications amid the crude enigmas of pastoral experience. Good sense and a right spirit mark the book, and the writer, though giving more room to symbolism than the orthodox would allow, is earnest in his defence of the moral perfection of Christ: "An Incarnation of God was needed to accomplish it."

W. J. F.